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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Timothy Paul Johnson appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of his 
petition for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
On February 22, 2008, a jury found Johnson guilty of felony driving under the 
influence and being a persistent violator of the law. (R., p.45.) Johnson appealed, and 
the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in an unpublished opinion. 
(R., p.55; State v. Johnson, 2009 Unpublished Op. No. 632, Docket No. 35236 (Idaho 
App., Oct. 13, 2009).) Remittitur entered on May 23, 2010. (R., p.55.) On May 21, 
2010, Johnson filed a petition for post-conviction relief with affidavit, pro se, and 
requested that the district court appoint counsel. (R., pp.4-12; 20-22.) The district court 
appointed counsel. (R., p.25.) Johnson, through counsel, filed an amended petition for 
post-conviction relief on September 23, 2010, which alleged additional claims and 
incorporated all of Johnson's prior claims. (R., pp.35-41.) 
The district court took judicial notice of the underlying criminal case. (R., p.44.) 
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(b), the district court informed the parties of its 
intention to summarily dismiss the petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.44-70.) 
Johnson, through counsel, filed an objection to dismissal and an additional affidavit in 
support of one of the amended petition's claims. (R., pp.87-91, 93-96.) Johnson, pro 
se, also filed a 73 page memorandum in support of his earlier petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.97-169.) On December 8, 2010, the district court, after 
reviewing the objection and affidavit, summarily dismissed all claims except the one 
1 
bolstered by the new affidavit, slightly altered its reasoning for dismissing that claim, 
and informed the parties of its intention to dismiss the remaining claim. (R., pp.180-98.) 
The district court also struck Johnson's 73 page prose memorandum. (Id.) 
On January 7, 2010, the district court summarily dismissed the remaining claim in 
the petition. (R., pp.205-22.) Johnson filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.200-01.) 
2 
ISSUES 
Johnson states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the District Court err in dismissing the claims under the 
petitioner's original petition for post conviction relief, or by it's [sic] Order to 
Strike the petitioner's memorandum in support, briefing the original claims 
in the original petition for post conviction relief, without an Evidentiary 
Hearing? 
2. Did the District Court err in Dismissing the additional Claims under 
the Amended Petition for post conviction relief, without an Evidentiary 
Hearing? 
3. Did the District Court abuse it's [sic] discretion when it used 
inadmissable [sic] Evidence of a recording that was not transcribed or a 
part of the clerks [sic] record as Evidence in support of the Courts [sic] 
Dismissal of the petitioner's petition for post conviction relief, Denying an 
Evidentiary Hearing? 
4. All subsidiary Issues listed in the Post Conviction Petition. 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.} 
The State consolidates and rephrases the issue as: 
Has Johnson failed to establish error in the district court's summary dismissal of 
his petition for post-conviction relief? 
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ARGUMENT 
Johnson Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of 
His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
A Introduction 
The district court, following the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906, 
summarily dismissed Johnson's petition for post-conviction relief. (R., pp.205-21.) 
Johnson claims that the district court erred in dismissing his petition without an 
evidentiary hearing, asserting that there were issues of material fact. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.4-42.) Johnson, however, failed to present evidence that supports his petition. The 
district court therefore correctly dismissed his petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (gfu]g Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). The Court freely reviews 
the district court's application of the law. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 
661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Johnson's Post-Conviction Petition 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 
4 
P.2d 548,550 (1983); Downing v. State, 132 Idaho 861,863,979 P.2d 1219, 1221 (Ct. 
App. 1999). Generally, the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-
conviction relief. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). 
However, unlike other civil complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must 
contain much more than a short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a 
complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(1 )." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 
1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) (quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 
626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). Instead, the application must be supported by a statement 
that "specifically set[s] forth the grounds upon which the application is based." ~ (citing 
I.C. § 19-4903). "The application must present or be accompanied by admissible 
evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State 
v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
A district court may summarily dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief when it 
"is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that 
the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief," by indicating its intention to dismiss 
and giving the parties an opportunity to respond within 20 days. I.C. § 19-4906(b). "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
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Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. 1,g_,. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 
Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application 
are insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record 
of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." 1,g_,. 
Correctly applying these standards, the district court considered whether the 
allegations contained in Johnson's petition and supporting affidavits failed to establish a 
genuine issue of material fact or otherwise failed as a matter of law. (R., pp.205-21.) 
Finding that Johnson's claims lacked the necessary factual support, the district court 
properly dismissed his petition. (Id.) In both its Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition 
(R., pp.44-70) and its Order Dismissing Petition and Amended Petition {R., pp.205-21 ), 
the district court carefully articulated the applicable legal standards and set forth, in 
detail, the reasons Johnson failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on any of 
his many claims. The State adopts these separate orders as its argument on appeal, 
copies of which are attached hereto as Appendices A and B, respectively. 1 
There is considerable overlap between the district court's Order Conditionally 
Dismissing Petition and its Order Dismissing Petition and Amended Petition. Unique to 
the former order is a helpful factual background to the case and the district court's 
taking of judicial notice of the underlying criminal record. Unique to the latter order are 
its grounds for dismissing all claims related to Johnson's witness, Rudy Bangi. 
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D. Johnson's Ancillary Claims Are Either Unsupported By Or Contrary To Applicable 
Legal Standards 
Johnson raises several ancillary claims on appeal, none of which are supported 
by applicable legal standards. 
Johnson argues that the district court erred by striking the 73 page memorandum 
Johnson filed prose. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) The district court struck this "rambling 
seventy-three (73) page, hand-written document that generally restate[d Johnson's] 
earlier pro se Petition and claims," on the grounds that Johnson was represented by 
counsel and so had to file his motions and memoranda through counsel. (R., pp.181-
83.) The State adopts the district court's reasoning, especially as found on pages 3-4, 
in its Order Striking Material Filed Pro Se, Vacating Evidentiary Hearing, Dismissing the 
Amended Petition, in Part, and Conditionally Dismissing the Remaining Claim (R., 
pp.180-98), a copy of which is attached hereto as Appendix C. 
Johnson argues that because he received a jury instruction on the affirmative 
defense of necessity at trial, the State was required to show that Johnson did not act out 
of necessity. (Appellant's brief, p.22.) Johnson asserts that, though the jury found him 
guilty, "the State failed to meet their [sic] burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt." 
(Id.) This sufficiency of the evidence claim was not presented to the district court below 
and is therefore improper on appeal. See Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 512, 
181 P.3d 435, 438 (2007); Row v. State, 135 Idaho 573, 580, 21 P.3d 895, 902 (2001 ). 
This is the type of claim that is appropriate for direct appeal and could have been raised 
to the Court previously but was not; it is therefore forfeited. I.C. § 19-4901. It is also 
barred on subsequent appeal by the principles of res judicata, because it could have 
been raised. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,766,760 P.2d 1174, 1182 (1988). 
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Johnson argues that the district court abused its discretion by taking judicial 
notice of an in-court discussion that was held on the record between the judge and the 
parties before voir dire. (Appellant's brief, p.44-45.) Prior to dismissing a petition for 
post-conviction relief, the district court is required to at least obtain that portion of the 
trial transcript which is necessary to a determination "on the basis of the application, the 
answer or motion, and the record," that there are no material issues of fact and that the 
petitioner is not entitled to post-conviction relief. State v. Matthews, 122 Idaho 801, 
808, 839 P.2d 1215, 1222 (1992). Under the Idaho Rules of Evidence, the district court 
may also take judicial notice of the underlying record sua sponte, as long as it identifies 
the documents it is noticing. See I.RE. 201(c). The district court identified and took 
notice of the entire underlying criminal record. (See R., p.44.) The district court's ability 
to take notice of in-court statements made on the record is not limited to those things of 
which Johnson approves. Johnson has failed to show error by the district court. 
On appeal, Johnson again attacks his sentence as being illegal. (Appellant's 
brief, pp.48-49.) This issue was finally decided in State v. Johnson, 2009 Unpublished 
Op. No. 632, Docket No. 35236 (Idaho App., Oct. 13, 2009). Johnson is barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata from raising and attempting to relitigate this issue which has 
already been finally decided. See Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 363, 883 P.2d 714, 
721 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Finally, Johnson claims that "the new DUI laws, I.C. [§] 18-8004, constitute an 
unlawful bill of atainder [sic] .... " (Appellant's brief, p.50.) This claim has no merit. A bill 
of attainder is a statute that (1) specifically identifies the people to be punished; (2) 
imposes punishment; and (3) does so without the benefit of judicial trial. United States 
8 
v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315-16 (1946). Idaho laws relating to DUI do not improperly 
criminalize persons, they criminalize behaviors (driving while intoxicated), thus not 
running afoul of the prohibition against bills of attainder. 
Throughout his many claims, Johnson has failed to establish any error by the 
district court in summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. The 
judgment of the district court should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's summary 
dismissal of Johnson's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011. 
PENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 19th day of October 2011, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by placing a copy in the United 
States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
TIMOTHY PAUL JOHNSON 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST ATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TIMOTHY PAUL JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No. CV-PC-2010-010011 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY 
DISMISSING PETITION 
On May 21, 2010, the Petitioner, Timothy Johnson, filed a Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, pro se, 1 alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial 
misconduct, "Brady"2 violations, and illegal blood draw. Johnson did not support his Petition with 
any admissible evidence or affidavits other than his affidavit which contained conclusory 
statements. 
The Court takes judicial notice of the underlying record in Case No. CR-FE-2007-00966 
(Formerly H0700966), including a transcript of the trial and sentencing, and pre-sentence report. 
At Johnson's request the Court appointed counsel on May 21, 2010. After a hearing, the Court 
ordered any Amended Petition to be filed by June 4, 2010. The Court also stayed the necessity for 
/ the State to answer to allow Johnson's counsel to determine whether an amended petition should 
be filed. On September 23, 2010, Johnson's attorney infom1ed the Court that Johnson would not 
allow him to eliminate any of Johnson's original claims and asked the Court to allow him to file 
additional claims in an Amended Petition. The Court granted the motion on October 4, 2010. 
1 Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration simply because they are representing themselves and are 
not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v. Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007); Sammis 
v. Magne(ek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318 (1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387,392, 797 P.2d 95, 
100 ( 1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112 Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385, 388 n.5 (1987). 
2 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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The State answered on October 4, 2010, and requested the Court dismiss Johnson's 
Petition. 
Having reviewed both the Petition and the Amended Petition and any evidence in a light 
most favorable to Johnson, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Johnson is not entitled to 
post-conviction relief. LC. § 9-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material 
fact and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Therefore, by this order, the 
Court is indicating its intention to dismiss Johnson's Petition and Amended Petition. 
Johnson and the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 
days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Petition and the 
Amended Petition dismissed, grant leave to file an amended application, or direct that the 
proceedings otherwise continue. Johnson may not file an amended application without leave 
of court. If he wishes to amend his petition at this point, he must file the appropriate motion and a 
copy of the proposed amended petition. 
BACKGROUND 
In this case, a jury found Johnson guilty of Operating a Motor Vehicle While Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and Drugs (One Felony Conviction Within Fifteen Years), Felony, 1.C. §§ 18-
8004, -8005(7), as a Persistent Violator of the Law, LC. § 19-2514. The Court imposed a unified 
sentence, enhanced as a Persistent Violator of the Law, of twenty (20) years fixed with life 
indeterminate. Johnson has a long criminal history for driving under the influence of alcohol or 
drugs (12 DUI charges with 10 convictions, including 5 felony DUI convictions). 
a. Proceedings prior to trial. 
Johnson was originally represented by the Ada County Public Defender's office. Just prior 
to his preliminary hearing, private counsel substituted into the case. 
Prior to trial, both in a written affidavit dated October 23, 2007, and orally, Johnson 
waived his right to speedy trial in order to allow his attorney to get the blood draw retested. In his 
affidavit, he testified, in relevant part, as follows: 
6. My attorney, Randall S. Barnum, explained my right to speedy trial pursuant 
to Idaho Code I 9-3501, which grants me the power to require my trial occur within 
six (6) months of my Arraignment. I am willing to waive this statutory right to a 
speedy and public trial of this matter and wish to have my trial postponed. 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING PETITION 
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On October 31, 2007, the Court carefully inquired as to his decision to waive his right to 
2 speedy trial and the Court carefully explained all of his constitutional rights as well as his statutory 
3 rights and told him it was up to him and not his attorney. Johnson waived. 
4 On November 14, 2007, Johnson attempted to plead guilty. In taking his plea, it became 
5 apparent that Johnson was under the influence of some substance and the Court ordered him to be 
6 tested. He tested positive for methamphetarnine and the Court ruled it could not accept his guilty 
7 plea. In addition, during the colloquy with Johnson it became apparent that Johnson challenged 
8 the blood alcohol results. Base on both issues, the Court refused to allow him to enter a plea that 
9 day. Johnson's attorney decided to have the blood retested. The Court raised his bond. 
1 O On December 12, 2007, Johnson's private counsel moved to withdraw on the basis that 
11 their relationship had so deteriorated he could no longer represent him. After discussing it with 
12 Johnson the Court granted his private counsel's motion and upon Johnson's request, the Court 
13 re-appointed the Ada County Public Defender's office. 
14 b. The testimony at trial. 
1 5 At trial, the evidence presented was that Johnson was going the wrong way, driving 
16 northbound in the southbound lanes, on Broadway Boulevard, a busy four lane street in Boise, 
I 7 Idaho, just before 9:00 p.m. with two passengers, when an officer pulled him over. Johnson 
18 smelled strongly of alcohol, and his eyes were glassy and bloodshot. He denied drinking but his 
19 speech was thick and slurred. The officer asked Johnson whether he took any medication, and he 
20 replied "oxycotin." Johnson told the officer that he had been hanging out at his pool all day, and 
21 his friend asked for a ride to WinCo where he was going to cash a check to buy more alcohol. The 
22 recording of the entire encounter clearly demonstrated just how intoxicated Johnson was. 
23 At trial, by stipulation of counsel, the Court ordered the tape redacted to remove the clear 
24 references to Johnson's lengthy D.U.I. history and why the officer was ordering a blood draw. 
25 At trial Johnson testified he "had" to drive because the owner of the vehicle had been 
26 driving and suffered some sort of medical crisis, collapsing at the wheel on Myrtle just beyond the 
27 WinCo. According to his testimony, this meant he "had" to get out of the back seat and drive in 
28 order to get her to the hospital. However, the entire encounter between Johnson and the officer 
29 was tape recorded and at no time did Johnson mention the "medical emergency." In fact, the 
30 officer released the car to be driven by this same person - the same one Johnson testified was 
11 
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suffering from a medical emergency. No one at the scene mentioned any alleged "medical 
2 emergency." Moreover, during the guilty plea colloquy in November 2007, Johnson never 
3 mentioned this scenario. While Johnson testified at trial to this alleged emergency and the Court 
4 gave the approved standard necessity defense instruction,3 the jury did not believe him and neither 
5 did the Court. 
6 The passenger he claimed was having the medical emergency died before trial and, thus, 
7 was not available to testify. Johnson's trial counsel represented to the Court that she had 
8 interviewed the other passenger, Rudy Bargi, and he was incoherent and did not remember the 
9 events very well. She explained that was why she did not bring him into court. 
IO Ultimately the officer found that Johnson's license had been suspended for a prior felony 
11 DUI. Johnson refused the breathalyzer and the officer told Johnson that he was going to take a 
12 blood sample. The blood sample showed Johnson had a blood alcohol level of 0.15 and upon 
13 retesting, it also showed he had benzodiazepam (Valium) in his system. Benzodiazepam is a 
14 central nervous system depressant and the testimony at trial established that its use intensifies the 
15 effects of alcohol on a person's ability to drive. 
16 The jury found him guilty. 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
3 The Court instructed the jury using the standard necessity instruction, ICJl 5012. The actual instruction given was as 
follows: 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20 
The defendant cannot be guilty of Operating a Motor Vehicle while Under the Influence of 
Alcohol and/or Drugs if the defendant acted because of necessity. Conduct which violates the law is 
justified by necessity if: 
I. there is a specific threat of immediate harm to Tawnia Mackerchar, and 
2. the defendant did not bring about the circumstances which created the threat of immediate 
harm, and 
3. the defendant could not have prevented the threatened harm by any less offensive 
alternative, and 
4. the hann caused by violating the law was less than the threatened harm. 
The standard to be applied is that of a reasonable person. The state must prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act because of necessity. If you have a reasonable doubt 
on that issue, you must find the defendant not guilty. 
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c. Johnson's DUI history. 
2 Johnson has a long criminal history, especially for DUL This was his nineteenth (19th) 
3 lifetime DUI charge and his fifth (5 th) felony conviction for DUI (1983, 1984, 1991, 20004) and 
4 tenth (10th) overall DUI conviction. Johnson also had five (5) misdemeanor DUI convictions in 
5 1976,5 1977, 1982, 1987, 1989.6 The 1987 misdemeanor conviction was prosecuted as a 
6 misdemeanor even though Johnson was on parole for two felony DUis when he was arrested for 
7 the new DUL 
8 Johnson also had nine other DUI charges dismissed as part of plea agreements. The 
9 following five (5)/elony DUI charges were incurred all in 1983 alone and were dismissed as part 
lo of a global plea agreement for his plea of guilty to a felony for a sixth 1983 DUI (5/6/83) charge. 
l I Those dismissed felony charges were incurred as follows: DUI (2/22/83), DUI (3/15/83), DUI 
12 (4/22/83), DUI (8/24/83), and DUI (9/12/83). The Court notes that Johnson incurred these DUI 
13 charges nearly monthly in 1983. In exchange for his guilty plea to the sixth charge incurred on 
14 May 6, 2008, the court withheld iudgment.7 Most of these DUI charges were accompanied by 
15 Driving Without Privileges because his license was suspended. In several of the DUis he had open 
16 containers as well. The May 6, 1983, DUI involved an accident, as discussed below. 
l 7 He was also charged with DUI in Oregon on September 8, 1984, but it was dismissed 
18 because Johnson was incarcerated in the Idaho penitentiary on a felony DUI in Idaho. 
19 In 1992, two DUis were dismissed as part of a plea agreement where they occurred only ten 
20 (I 0) days apart,8 even though he was on parole for his second felony DUI when he got these two 
21 DUI charges. Another felony DUI was dismissed in 1999 as part of a plea agreement when he was 
22 convicted of his third felony DUI. 
23 
24 
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d. Johnson's other criminal history. 
Johnson also incurred 24 misdemeanor convictions including the above listed DUis, nearly 
all involving drinking and/or driving. Those criminal convictions include Reckless Driving ( 1974), 
4 A second felony DUI was dismissed. These two DUis occurred within 5 months of each other. 
5 Driving While Suspended was dismissed. 
6 Open Container dismissed. 
7 The withheld was revoked. See May 6, 1992 pre-sentence report, fi"ont page. 
8 March 15, 1992, and March 25, 1992. 
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Resisting and Obstructing (1989), Petit Theft (1983, 19839), Failure to Maintain Lanes ( 1987), 
2 Illegal Possession of Beer/ Alcohol (1976, 1976), Inattentive Driving (l 988), Failure to Give 
3 Information at Accident (1988), Driving Without Privileges/Driving While Suspended (1975, 
4 1976, 1977, 1988, 1988, 1989, 1989, 1989), Disorderly Conduct (1977), Domestic Abuse/ Assault 
5 IV (2000 10) and numerous contempts, probation and parole violations and Failures to Appear. He 
6 has never had a successful probation or parole. 
7 The following 22 charges were also dismissed, many as part of global plea agreements: 
8 Driving Without Privileges/Driving While Suspended ( 1976, l 983, 1983, 1992), Receiving Stolen 
9 Property (Felony) (1976), Battery (1978, 1983, 1983), Open Container (1981, 1989), 
IO Resisting/Obstructing (l 981, 1988), Aiding & Abetting Theft ( 1982), Petit Theft by Fraud ( 1983), 
11 Fictitious Display (] 983, 1983, I 983), Failure to Provide Insurance (I 983, 1983, 1983), False 
12 Information to Police (2000), and Fugitive Harassment (2000). 
13 e. Many of Johnson's DUis were accompanied by accidents. 
14 The Court notes that associated with at least five of his DUI charges, Johnson either had 
15 accidents causing damage to other vehicles or to his own or had near accidents. Luckily no one 
16 was injured and there was only property damage. 
] 7 For example, in his DUI on May 6, 1983, Johnson slid through an intersection at Owyhee 
18 and Targee, Boise, Idaho, went over a curb and struck a telephone pole. Johnson then backed up 
19 through the intersection and took off down Targee where he rear-ended another vehicle. His blood 
20 alcohol was .l 7. His license was suspended at the time. 
21 On July 3, 1989, he backed through an intersection at Fairview and Garden and nearly 
22 struck on-coming traffic. 
23 On March 15, 1992, Johnson hit another vehicle properly parked on 26 th Street in Boise, 
24 Idaho. His license was suspended at the time. He pushed the vehicle over the curb and onto the 
25 grass and did $2,466.80 in damage to that vehicle. He then left the scene. Both vehicles were 
26 damaged. 
27 
28 
29 9 Burglary was dismissed. 
30 10 Amended from a Felony. 
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On May 31, 1999, Johnson hit two parked vehicles while driving under the influence in the 
2 Julia Davis Park by the band shell in Boise, Idaho. A former police officer saw Johnson hit a 
3 vehicle as he attempted to park. After hitting this vehicle he moved his car farther away and again 
4 hit another vehicle. Johnson then left his car and the former police officer stated he was staggering 
5 very badly and appeared very intoxicated. In fact, the former officer was so concerned that he 
6 walked over to Johnson's vehicle and removed the keys from the ignition in order to prevent any 
7 
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further damage. He called the police. When the police arrived they confirmed his observations of 
Johnson and observed that Johnson staggered so badly that the officer put his arms out to catch 
him. Johnson denied he was driving the car and refused the breathalyzer. 
Just six months later, on November 7, 1999, a Maverick store clerk called in a possible 
DUI because he saw Johnson back into the "Thrifty Nickel case" outside his store. This store clerk 
refused to sell Johnson beer because he thought Johnson was intoxicated and could smell the 
alcohol coming from Johnson's person. The clerk wrote down the license number when Johnson 
drove away and called 911. The officers found Johnson and learned that the plate was a fictitious 
plate. Again, like before, Johnson's license was suspended at the time and there were two cans of 
open beer between the seats. Johnson again refused the breathalyzer. 
Johnson is extremely dangerous to the community, and he simply will not stop drinking 
and driving. Nothing seems to stop him, except incarceration. 
f. Numerous parole officers and pre-sentence investigators have recommended 
long incarcerations to protect the community. 
A review of the pre-sentence investigator and parole officer recommendations and 
observations is chilling. With regularity, the pre-sentence investigator or parole officer came to 
the conclusion that he was an extreme risk to the community and needed to be incarcerated. 
As early as his first pre-sentence report prepared for Judge Bail in a felony DUI (BAC .17), 
the pre-sentence investigator in 1983 concluded as follows: 
Mr. Johnson would appear to constitute a continued high risk to the public until his 
alcohol problem is controlled. 
In this DUI Johnson had collided with an oncoming vehicle and left the scene of an accident he 
caused while he was on probation for a previous Operating a Motor Vehicle while Under the 
Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs. 
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Just one year later, the pre-sentence investigator in Johnson's 1984 pre-sentence report 
prepared for Judge Lodge concluded as follows: 
He has not taken advantage of the benefits of alcohol treatment programs and does 
not appear to have learned anything from his excessive contacts with the judicial 
system nor does it appear that he has been motivated to change his life style. It is 
the opinion of this investigator that he continues to be a menace to society and 
should be placed in a structured environment. 
Likewise, the pre-sentence investigator in Johnson's 1985 pre-sentence report for a 
probation violation in his 1983 felony DUI, again opined as follows: 
The defendant has participated in two in-patient treatment programs, yet continues 
to drink and drive. This investigator feels that the defendant will continue to be a 
risk in the community until he resolves his substance abuse problem. Until that 
time, a structured environment seems to be the only remaining alternative. 
While on probation for this DUI, Johnson had continued to drink and committed a new DUI and 
drove without privileges. 
Like the pre-sentence investigators in 1983, 1984, and 1985, the pre-sentence investigator 
, in Johnson's 1991 pre-sentence report for a new DUI concluded as follows: 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
. . . this investigator does not feel Mr. Johnson is an appropriate candidate for 
probation as this will be the defendant's third felony conviction for an alcohol-
related offense, this investigator believes some penal incarceration is warranted as it 
does not appear the defendant has learned from his previous penitentiary 
incarceration since he chooses to continue to drink and drive. 
Similarly, the pre-sentence investigator in Johnson's 2000 pre-sentence report also 
concluded he was a danger to the community and stated as follows: 
21 It is apparent that the defendant is in need of long-term treatment, however, his 
22 willingness to participate and follow through is less than successful. Mr. Johnson 
has been afforded several opportunities to complete intensive treatment through 
23 numerous agencies. He has served local as well as penal incarceration however, 
24 continues to drink and drive. I believe he is a danger to society with his reckless 
behavior of drinking and driving. I do not feel the defendant has learned from his 
25 previous penitentiary incarcerations as this will be his fourth felony conviction for 
26 an alcohol related offense. At this time Mr. Johnson is a threat to society and he 
should be incarcerated to protect the citizens within the community. 
27 
This pre-sentence investigator recognized that Johnson simply did not follow through with 
J 
28 11 
' treatment and treatment had not been successful. 
29 
30 
~1 
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His parole officer in 1992 stated that Johnson was a probation officer's nightmare. While 
he had been released from the penitentiary, he failed to complete the treatment ordered and 
incurred another DUI while on parole only eight months. Most of his blood alcohol results were 
excessive including .23, .24, .16, .19 and .15 in this case. In his 1983 felony conviction he blew a 
.29 and had struck several vehicles. As one evaluator opined, a blood alcohol level of .15 or 
greater indicates tolerance to alcohol. 
While he was released early by the Parole Board on his latest parole in May 24, 2004, 
within one month of being placed on parole, his parole officer found that he had been evicted from 
his residence because "he had been drinking." Johnson failed to tell the parole officer what his 
new residence was. That parole officer recommended as follows: 
On March 11, 2002, Mr. Johnson was placed on parole. He has only been out for 
about 1 month and already he has decided to avoid supervision. Mr. Johnson has 
been given every opportunity to be successful on parole. He was given the 
privilege of the RSAT program and the benefit of being out on Parole. He was 
attending the RSAT Transition group and the Cognitive Self-Change Phase III, both 
of which it appears he did not utilize in his parole. It was made clear to Mr. 
Johnson that he would have to abide by his conditions of Parole. 
It appears as though Mr. Johnson did not benefit from the RSAT program and every 
other program provided to him by the Idaho Department of Correction and has 
decided to abscond. 
Therefore, due to Mr. Johnson's blatant lack of respect for the parole commission 
and his conditions of parole, I would like to respectfully recommend that a parole 
commission warrant be issued. I would also recommend that parole revocation 
proceedings begin. 
The Parole Board ignored his recommendation and, in fact, released Johnson early from 
superv1s10n. Upon release from supervision, Johnson admitted to the pre-sentence investigator 
that he resumed drinking alcohol as a way to "self-medicate."' 1 He admitted that he would 
consume between two and three beers each night at his home but claims he would not drive. 
Finally, in the current pre-sentence report, like all the prior pre-sentence investigators, the 
pre-sentence investigator concluded he was a danger to the community and stated as follows: 
In my opinion, Mr. Johnson poses an extreme risk to the community, as he 
habitually drinks and drives and does not seem committed to remaining substance 
30 11 Interestingly, while incarcerated he often failed to take his "medication." 
11 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING PETITION 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-01001 9 000052 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
IO 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
-:t 1 
abuse free. It is my opinion that Mr. Johnson's lack of deterrence and lack of 
regard for others' safety warrant penal incarceration. 
This Court agrees. Nothing seems to make any difference. Johnson continues to drink and drive --
even while on parole and under supervision. A long fixed sentence is absolutely necessary to 
protect the public from Johnson's choices to drink and to drive. A long indeterminate sentence is 
also necessary to ensure that once released, Johnson is supervised. 
g. The I.C. § 19-2524 evaluation concluded be would likely continue to commit 
the same crimes. 
The Court ordered a mental health evaluation pursuant to LC.§ 19-2524 given Johnson's 
claims that he had mental health problems. The evaluator concluded after extensive testing that he 
was not bi-polar and did not have an Axis I diagnosis other than Alcohol Dependence. However, 
according to the evaluator he "gave no evidence of a mental disorder before his substance abuse 
problems began." In fact, she opined that alcohol abuse made "it very difficult if not dangerous for 
any pharmacological treatment." She also observed as follows: 
The patient's condition would likely remain the same with no treatment. Clients 
who are forced into substance abuse treatment programs have not been known to do 
well in the end. 
*** 
The client will likely continue to commit the same types of crimes as he has in the 
past. 
The evaluator did not prepare a treatment plan as a result because she did not believe treatment 
would change Johnson's behavior. 
h. Treatment bas not worked. 
Johnson has had substantial treatment and has attended a number of inpatient treatment 
programs. While incarcerated he completed 36 hours of Drug And Alcohol Education, 38 hours of 
Relapse Prevention, Anger Management, 20 hours of 12-Step Study Group, Breaking Barriers, 
Thinking for a Change, Therapeutic Community and Cognitive Change I, II, and III. 
He previously completed treatment at the Port of Hope but failed to comply with his 
aftercare program. See 1992 Pre-Sentence Report. He also completed an inpatient treatment 
program at Alcohol Recovery Center in Ontario, Oregon in March 1984. Id. He failed to complete 
a number of court ordered programs, failing on numerous occasions to show up for scheduled 
treatment - the Nelson Institute. Id. In 1990, he entered an inpatient treatment program at the 
ORDER CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING PETITION 
CASE NO. CV-PC-2010-01001 10 000053 
Alcohol Treatment Unit in Orofino and completed it May 31, 1990. In 2004, he completed the 
2 Avanti First Step Drug/Alcohol Program, attended AA and Pure Word. 
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i. Every time Johnson was paroled, even while supervised, he violated by using 
alcohol and/or drugs or getting a new DUI. 
When Johnson was paroled from his 1992 conviction, Case No. 18058, he violated his 
parole within 18 months by drinking and was sent back to prison where he topped out in July 
1998. He told the pre-sentence investigator in 2000 that when he was released in l 994 on parole 
in this case, he began to drink. He told her, "the first time I drank I got drunk, then I would drink a 
few beers after work, but not to get drunk, just a few beers." When Johnson was released after 
topping out his prison sentence, he picked up a new DUI within 11 months ofrelease -- June 1999. 
He then got another DUI in November 1999. 
While he was released early by the Parole Board on his latest parole in May 24, 2004, 
within one month of being placed on parole, his parole officer found that he had been evicted from 
his residence because "he had been drinking." 
Likewise, when Judge Bail placed him on probation for his 1983 DUI on November 7, 
1983, less than two years later, a Motion for Probation violation was filed on January 9, l 985, for 
, two additional DUis: one in Oregon on September 8, 1984, and one in Payette on November 3, 
17 
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1984. Judge Bail imposed sentence and Johnson was paroled on July 9, 1986. He incurred a new 
DUI on March 14, I 987, and Resisting/Obstructing on April 14, 1988. Unfortunately the parole 
officer did not violate him. 
In other words, the community cannot trust that even on parole and under supervision, this 
individual wil I not drink or use drugs and will not drive. Johnson is extremely dangerous. The 
Parole Board has not protected the community by enforcing the supervision rules against drinking 
and driving. If Johnson is released without very close supervision, a parole officer willing to 
violate him for drinking, or a Parole Board willing to revoke parole for his flagrant violations, it is 
; just a matter of time before Johnson kills or harms some other person or himself. 
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While some people get DUis after being stopped for relatively innocuous things like 
broken tail lights, Johnson's driving patterns are extremely troubling. He has accidents, leaves the 
scene, carries no insurance and has a pattern that shows little concern for the effects of his choices. 
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The Court's primary concern in imposing a 20 year fixed sentence and life indeterminate was to 
2 protect the public. 
3 The Court opined that Johnson continues to drink and drive whether licensed or not, 
4 whether treated and whether he is under supervision. His driving clearly placed the community at 
5 significant risk. The Court ruled that it must do something to get him off the street. 
6 j. Johnson's Motion to Reconsider. 
7 Johnson timely filed a Motion to Reconsider under 1.C.R. 35, which the Court denied on 
8 July 21, 2008. Johnson filed a second Motion to Reconsider May 29, 2009, which the Court 
9 denied on June 2, 2009, as untimely and not allowed. In response, Johnson filed a "Motion to 
1 o Alter or Amend Judgment," and claimed that his earlier motion was not untimely because it was 
11 really a motion to correct an illegal sentence12 which can be filed at any time. However, the Court 
12 denied this Motion noting that a successive Rule 35 motion was not allowed. 13 
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k. Johnson appealed. 
Johnson appealed and the Court of Appeals affirmed his conviction and sentence in an 
unpublished decision October 23, 2009. The decision was remitted on May 23, 2010. 
JOHNSON'S POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS 
Johnson makes the following claims in his Petition: 
(denied the right to atty rep, upon arrest) (forced blood draw) (.15 bac evidence 
amended into the Information, read to the Jury)(ineffective asst. of counsel) 
(unlawful breath and urin [sic] test, Court hearing, November 14, 2007 denied to 
retest to rebutt [sic])(denying plea of guilty, notifying jury of plea)(denied fast and 
speedy trial rights)(Prosecuting attorney investigator prosecutorial misconduct, 
witholding [sic] evidence information) Failure to suppress evidence late disclosure 
12 Johnson claimed that his sentence was improperly enhanced twice, but the Court held he was wrong. To be 
convicted of felony D.U.I. the state must show the requisite prior convictions. Moreover, the statute upon which he 
relies does not apply to his case. LC. § l 9-2520E applies to multiple sentencing enhancements related to crimes with a 
fireann or where great bodily hann is inflicted. Johnson's sentence was enhanced as a persistent violator under J.C. § 
19-2514. 
13 I.C.R. 35 provides that "no defendant may file more than one motion seeking a reduction of sentence under this 
Rule". I.C.R. 35 clearly prohibits the filing of more than one motion for a reduction of sentence. The Court of 
Appeals recently held that the prohibition of successive motions under Rule 35 is a jurisdictional limit. State v. 
Battens, 137 ldaho 730, 733, 52 P.3d 875, 878 (Ct. App. 2002). Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction to entertain 
successive motions under this rule. See also, State v. Wers/and. 125 ldaho 499, 505, 873 P .2d 144, 149-50 (1994). 
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....,,,. 
blood retest and expert witness Susan Williams prosecutorial and judicial 
misconduct (continued) attachment 
Continued Grounds for Post-Conviction Relief 
I. failure to continue trial, mental health evaluation 
2. prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, unlawful re-testing of blood evidence, 
chain of custody, after discovery was closed and late disclosure of BAC 
evidence, and expert witness Susan Williams 
3. denied a fair trial, erroneous exclusion of all defense witnesses and evidence, 
including eye witness testimony 
4. judicial misconduct vigilanti [sic] Court justice, Judge being Judge, 
Prosecutor, Jury 
5. Bias judge 
6. Court allowing State witness to stay in Court room to hear testimony of other 
witnesses after exclusion motion (BPD Casy [sic] Handcuff [sic]) 
7. prosecutorial misconduct redacting audio tapes on her own 
8. " " lying to the jury, confusing the jury of location of arrest - stating accross 
[sic] the street from WINCO store 
9. tweeking [sic] the necessity defense instruction 
10. improperly instructing the jury 
11. not fully instructing the jury 
12. prejudicial statements pros. closing arguments 
13. unlawfully present part II and III of the information 
14. excessive sentence penalties enhancements 
15. failure to rebutt [sic] psi 
16. denial of witnesses at sentencing 
17. "disproportionate sentence," "unconstitutionally excessive'' 
18. Courts [sic] unlawfull use of unsubstantiated facts in the Defendants [sic] 
criminal history 
19. unlawful bill of attainder law" statutory enhancements 
20. "acculmutive [sic] error doctrine" 
21. total unlawful miscarriage of justice by the trial court 
22. fundamental error, miscarriage of justice 
23. transcript tampering (request for supeona [sic] of full Court trial proceeding 
"audio tape recordings)" note to appointed counsel 
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24. will reserve the right to amend petition according, please supeona [sic] 
defense counsel public defender Many Hessing and public defender Michael 
Lojek to testify of knowledge of judicial misconduct, and bias, ineffective 
assistance and file motion to disqualify judge 
Johnson then explains that his counsel was ineffective as follows: 
Failure to investigate a viable defense, failure to contact defense witnesses, failure 
to supeona [sic] defense witnesses, eye witnesses and expert witnesses 
Failure to file appropriate motions, suppression motions, fact and speedy trial 
dismissal motions 
Failure to object to simple matters of law, helping the State in a conviction, 
recieving [sic] judicial moni tary [sic] bribes 
Johnson supported his Petition by filing the following affidavit in which he "testified" in relevant 
part as follows: 
3. that the Petitioner was denied a fair trial, and due process of law - courts 
[sic] exclusion of all defense witnesses and evidence, including eye witness 
testimony, and expert defense witnesses 
4. that the Petitioner was denied defense counsel, amounting to a constitutional 
violation of inefective [sic] assistance of defense counsel 
5. that the trial transcripts are "not" true and correct to the best of my 
knowledge and belief (inciniating [sic] transcript tampering) 
6. the prosecution withe Id [sic] evidence of an presecuting attorney 
investigator's report - that if disclosed would have exonerated the Petitioner in this 
above case 
7. that the judge knowingly and intentionally participated in judicial 
misconduct, allowing unlawful blood testing, late disclosires [sic] of results and 
expert witnesses to be ammitted [sic] at trial prejudicing the defense even further 
8. that the· Petitioner is innocent of the charges by acting out in [sic] 
"necessity" 
That the judge biasly [sic] found the Petitioner guilty of the offense and pronounced 
sentence at a pre-trial hearing months before trial evan [sic] began, and public 
defender Mike Lojeck has direct knowlege [sic] of this statement. 
Johnson's appointed conflict counsel on post-conviction filed an Amended Petition that 
further alleges his trial counsel were ineffective as follows: 
l. Failure to investigate the factual and legal defenses, including, without 
limitation, the failure to conduct an adequate investigation into whether a necessity 
defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of witnesses 
Rudy Bargi and Tonya McKurcher. 
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2. Although McKurcher had passed away prior to the trial, McKurcher spoke 
to investigators from the prosecutor's office some time prior to her death. Such 
information may have been useful in cross examining witnesses or developing a 
defense. 
3. Witness Rudy Bargi was not called at trial. Although trial counsel 
represented to the court that Mr. Bargi did not remember the events very well and 
was "incoherent" the Petitioner disputes this characterization and alleges that his 
trial attorney should have subpoenaed this material trial witness. The Petitioner was 
prejudiced by the failure of counsel to call a witness that could have testified as to 
the medical condition of McKurcher on the date of the arrest. 
4. The Petitioner's counsel failed to effectively assist the Petitioner at trial in 
objecting to evidence that was inadmissible or prejudicial, to wit: 
a. failing to adequately object to Officer Hancock's testimony with 
regard to accuracy and scientific validity of HGN testing results consistent 
with a .15 blood alcohol content and the presence of benzodiazepine type 
drugs. 
b. failing to challenge the scientific basis and assertion by the state that 
horizontal gaze nystagmus can only be caused by "three drug categories plus 
one rare disease." 
c. failing to adequately object to and exclude evidence of the 
defendant's attempted guilty plea ofNovember 14, 2007. 
d. failing to object to the impeachment of the defendant with secondary 
blood testing results although the defendant did not dispute the result of .15 
on direct testimony. 
e. failing to object to cross examination regarding prior court 
proceedings, tactical and strategic conversations with counsel, and the 
timeliness of raising the necessity defense "before last Friday." 
f. failing to object to the jury instructions on the necessity defense. 
g. failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding the defendant's 
guilty plea. 
5. The Idaho State Appellate Public Defender in this case represented the 
Petitioner on appeal. Appellate counsel did not provide effective assistance of 
counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution. 
Appellate counsel failed to raise any challenge to any of the evidentiary rulings 
identified in ['4 above] of this Petition. 
21 I I Johnson filed no additional support by way of admissible evidence or affidavits for any of these 
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new allegations. 
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ANALYSIS 
A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal, 
whichever is later. I.C. § 19-4902. The Court finds his Petition was timely filed. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post conviction 
relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Idaho Code 
§ l 9-4906(b) provides as follows: 
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and 
the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its 
intention to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall 
be given an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence raises no issue of 
material fact, which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759,763,819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145,146,754 P.2d 
458, 459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Johnson never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue material to the Court's decision. 
The only affidavit he filed in support contained no admissible evidence and only contained a series 
of conclusory allegations. The Court is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 
125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156,159, 
715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). To the extent any factual allegations are not conclusory and 
are supported by admissible evidence, the Court has assumed the factual allegations true for the 
purposes of this Decision unless clearly not supported by the record. The Court is not required to 
accept a petitioner's claims as true where the record clearly demonstrates the facts as otherwise. 
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely 
distinct from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 
110, 111 (2001 ). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary 
civil action, however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain 
statement of the claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v. 
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State, 133 Idaho 794, 797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). The application must present or be 
2 accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject 
3 to dismissal. Id. Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, ~ 
4 preponderance of the evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c). 14 
5 Thus, the question on summary disposition is whether the application, affidavits and other 
6 evidence supporting the application allege facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. 
7 Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 
8 892 P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1995). In other words, the application must present, or be 
9 accompanied by, admissible evidence supporting allegations, or the application will be deemed 
1 O subject to dismissal. Finally, "[i]f the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-
I 1 conviction claim," or if the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is 
12 appropriate. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 
13 518,523, 164 P.3d 798,803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 
14 (1990). 
15 Thus, the Court may summarily dismiss Johnson's Petition if the Court is satisfied he is not 
16 entitled to the relief he requests. 
17 I. 
18 
THE COURT INTENDS TO DISMISS ALL THE CLAIMS ASSERTED IN 
JOHNSON'S ORIGINAL PETITION AS CONCLUSORY AND UNSUPPORTED. 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
Johnson's original Petition is replete with unsupported conclusory allegations and the 
Court may dismiss on that basis alone. Many of the claims do not make sense or are disproven by 
the record. For example, Johnson's speedy trial claims are clearly disproven by the record, and the 
Court dismisses them. Johnson clearly waived any speedy trial rights both in writing and orally in 
October 2007. McKay, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700; Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 
803; Stuart, 118 Idaho at 869, 801 P.2d at 1220. In addition, the trial was continued more than 
once at his request. 
Likewise, his claims regarding the redaction of the arrest tape are dismissed; the Court only 
allowed the redaction of the tape upon stipulation of all counsel to protect Johnson from 
statements regarding his extensive prior D.U.I. history. Moreover, the Court gave Johnson the 
14 I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by 
30 a preponderance of the evidence. 
11 
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opportunity to introduce the entire un-redacted version and he did not ask the Court to allow its 
2 introduction. In addition, while Johnson complains about the jury instruction on necessity, the jury 
3 instruction given to the jury was the standard approved jury instruction and he does not indicate 
4 what was improper about it. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims asserted in his 
5 original post-conviction Petition as clearly disproven by the record: 
6 
7 
8 
I. 
2. 
3. 
prosecutorial misconduct redacting audio tapes on her own 
speedy trial claims 
any claims regarding the propriety of the necessity instruction 
9 Likewise, the Court dismisses those claims where Johnson fails to identify what statements 
IO or what jury instructions were in error or how they adversely affected his case. Those claims that 
11 are merely conclusory or unsupported by admissible evidence are also summarily dismissed, 
12 including the following: 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
11 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
"failure to continue trial, mental health evaluation" -- Johnson fails to 
identify what facts support his conclusory claim. 
"prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, unlawful re-testing of blood 
evidence, chain of custody, after discovery was closed and late disclosure of 
BAC evidence, and expert witness Susan Williams" -- Johnson fails to 
identify what facts support his conclusory claim. 
"denied a fair trial, erroneous exclusion of all defense witnesses and 
evidence, including eye witness testimony" -- Johnson fails to identify 
what facts support his conclusory claim, what defense witnesses were 
excluded or what they would have added to the case. 
"judicial misconduct vigilanti [sic] Court justice, Judge being Judge, 
Prosecutor, Jury" -- Johnson fails to identify what facts support his 
conclusory claim. 
"Bias judge" -- Johnson fails to identify what constituted bias and what 
facts support his conclusory claim. 
"Court allowing State witness to stay in Court room to hear testimony of 
other witnesses after exclusion motion (BPD Casy [sic] Handcuff [sic])" -
The State is entitled to have a representative sit at counsel table. 
"" " lying to the jury, confusing the jury of location of arrest - stating 
accross [sic] the street from WINCO store" - The Court has been unable 
to find this in the record. 
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11 
8. "tweeking [sic] the necessity defense instruction" -- Johnson fails to 
identify how the necessity defense instruction was "tweeked" - it is the 
I.C.J.I. 
9. "prejudicial statements pros. closing arguments" - Johnson fails to identify 
what prejudicial statements were made in closing. 
I 0. "failure to rebutt [sic] pre-sentence report" -- Johnson fails to identify 
what his counsel should have rebutted in the pre-sentence report or 
how it would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
11. "denial of witnesses at sentencing" - Johnson fails to identify what 
witnesses he would have presented during sentencing, what they would 
have added and how that would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
12. "acculmutive [sic] error doctrine" - Johnson fails to support this 
conclusory allegation or to explain what amounts to cumulative error. 
13. "transcript tampering" -- Johnson fails to identify what was wrong in the 
transcript. 
14. "Failure to investigate a viable defense, failure to contact defense witnesses, 
failure to supeona [sic] defense witnesses, eye witnesses and expert 
witnesses" - Johnson fails to identify what defense should have been 
investigated, what witnesses were not contacted or subpoenaed and 
what expert witnesses should have been hired. Johnson fails to support 
his conclusory allegations with any admissible evidence. 15 
15. "Failure to file appropriate motions, suppression motions, fact and speedy 
trial dismissal motions" -- Johnson fails to support these conclusory 
allegations or identify what motions should have been filed or how they 
would have changed the outcome. 
16. "Failure to object to simple matters of law, helping the State in a conviction, 
recieving [sic] judicial monitary [sic] bribes" - Johnson fails to support 
15 While this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 
Idaho 121,952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on 
trial counsel's failure to procure expert witnesses, the accused "must assert facts that would have been discovered by 
additional investigation and should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the 
experts had been requested." Aeschliman v. Stale, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting 
State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, I 46 (I 997)(emphasis added)). In the instant matter, Johnson 
presented no facts that such an expert would have presented exculpatory evidence and presented no expert testimony. 
ln order to create a valid claim, Johnson must present the Court with what an expert would have found and what 
evidence would have been produced. Otherwise, the Court is left to speculate as to any prejudicial impact on the 
outcome due to trial counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. Id. Thus, even if Johnson produced evidence at an 
evidentiary hearing that everything he says is true, he is also required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence 
which includes expert testimony, that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged deficiency; prejudice is shown by 
demonstrating the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Ramirez, I I 9 Idaho at l 041, 
812 P.2d at 755. 
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these conclusory allegations or identify what objections should have 
been made or bow the objections would have changed the outcome. 
Johnson provides no support for bis accusation of bribes. 
17. "forced blood draw" - "denied the right to atty rep, upon arrest" - Johnson 
fails to understand that a person who drives a motor vehicle on 
highways in Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary 
testing to determine concentration of alcohol or other intoxicants, so 
Jong as the peace officer making the request for testing has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in physical 
control of a vehicle while under the influence of such substances. J.C. § 
18-8002(1) 16; Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 65 P.3d 534 (2003). 
This implied consent includes the right to have a suspect's blood 
drawn. See State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). 
Furthermore, the implied consent statute in I.C. § 18-8002(2) 17 clearly 
provides that person suspected of driving while intoxicated does not 
have the right to consult with attorney before submitting to evidentiary 
testing. See also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P.Jd 257 (2002). 
18. "Prosecuting attorney investigator prosecutorial misconduct, witholding 
[sic] evidence information" - Johnson failed to identify the evidence he 
claims was withbeld. 18 
Moreover, to the extent these claims could have been raised on appeal and were not; they are 
waived. LC.§ 19-490l(b); See Whitehawkv. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780P.2d 153, 154-55 
(Ct.App.1989) (citing LC.§ 19-4901(b)). 
The Court dismisses the remaining claims made in the original Petition because they could 
have been raised on appeal. Id. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims made in the 
original Petition: 
16 l.C. § 18-8002(1 ). Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be 
deemed to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, 
Idaho Code, and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating 
substances, provided that such testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to 
believe that person has been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of 
section 18-8004, Idaho Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
17 l.C. § 18-8002(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to such 
evidentiary testing. 
18 Because Johnson failed to show what information or evidence was destroyed or the exculpatory nature of the 
infonnation allegedly destroyed, he cannot establish a right to its disclosure or production. The Court is not required 
to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's conclusions of 
law. Roman v. State, 125 [daho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 
159,715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, dismissal of Johnson's Brady claims is proper. 
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2 
3 
l. "fundamental error, miscarriage of justice" 
2. 
3. 
"unlawful bill of attainder law" statutory enhancements 
"disproportionate sentence," .. unconstitutionally excessive" 
4 Moreover, a claim that a sentence is unduly harsh, excessive or disproportionate affords no basis 
5 for post-conviction relief unless the sentence is ilJegal; Johnson makes no claim that the sentence 
6 was illegal. LC.§ l 9-490l(a); Evans v. State, 127 Idaho 662, 664, 904 P.2d 574, 576 (Ct. App. 
7 1995); Ruiz v. State, 122 Idaho 222, 223, 832 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Ct. App. 1992); Williams v. State, 
8 113 Idaho 685, 687, 747 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1987). Post-conviction relief proceedings are 
9 designed to permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal sentence; they are not 
IO intended as a means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the trial court 
l l exercised its sentencing discretion. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 51 960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998). 
12 Finally, on appeal, Johnson challenged his sentence and the Court of Appeals affirmed it. 
1 3 Therefore, he cannot raise it on post-conviction because when legal issues are decided in a 
14 criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from 
15 
1 
raising them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, _, 966 
I 
16 P.2d 1, 23 (1998); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231, 233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Post-
17 j conviction relief is not available merely to challenge a judge's exercise of discretion. Whitehawk 
18 v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct.App. 1989); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 
19 189,741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct.App.1987). 
20 · II. THE COURT INTENDS TO DISMISS THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
COUNSEL CLAIMS ASSERTED IN THE AMENDED PETITION. 
Like his failure to support his claims made in the original Petition, Johnson fails to support 
any of his new claims in the Amended Petition. The Court intends to dismiss all of them. Johnson 
makes ineffective assistance of counsel claims against his trial counsel and against his appellate 
counsel. 
In an ineffective counsel claim, to establish a deficiency, an applicant must establish two 
26 
I j things. The applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
27 I 
28 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
29 
(1988); Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001). However, there is 
30 
. a strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of "professional 
11 
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-assistance" and will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on 
2 inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
3 evaluation. Aragon, 114 ldaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. 
4 In addition, an applicant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was 
5 prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency; prejudice is shown by demonstrating the outcome would 
6 have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); Ramirez v. State, 
7 • I 19 Idaho 1037, 1041, 812 P.2d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 1991). Further, "[t]o establish prejudice, the 
8 applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
9 outcome of the trial would have been different." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 
JO 787, 792 (2002) (quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280,282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct. App. 2001)). 
11 It is against this backdrop that the Court analyzes all of Johnson's ineffective counsel claims. 
12 Contrary to Johnson's claim, defense counsel is not required to raise every conceivable 
13 issue. Aragon v. Slate, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Idaho appellate courts 
14 will not second guess strategic and tactical decisions of trial counsel whether to pursue a particular 
15 issue or theory, unless there is "evidence that the decision was the result of inadequate preparation, 
16 ignorance of the law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Short v. State, 135 
17 Idaho 40, 13 P.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (Ct.App. 2000) (citingHuckv. State, 124 Idaho 155,160,857 
18 P.2d 634,639 (Ct.App.1993)). 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
A. Johnson presented no admissible evidence that his trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate his necessity defense. 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c). Without any evidence, 
Johnson simply concludes that his counsel failed "to conduct an adequate investigation into 
whether a necessity defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of 
witnesses Rudy Bargi and Tonya McKurcher." He presents no affidavits from his trial counsel or 
Bargi. Likewise, he did not support his Amended Petition with any evidence regarding what 
McKurcher may have told the prosecutor. Johnson's claims fail because he presents no evidence 
of what these witnesses would have said at trial and, thus, he cannot establish the prejudice prong 
of the Strickland analysis. 
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1 Moreover, defendant has the burden of identifying the acts or omissions of counsel that are 
2 alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, supra 466 
3 U.S. at 695. As to a trial counsel's choice of witnesses, her manner of conducting cross-
4 examination, and her lack of objection to the so-called damaging testimony, these points fall 
5 within "trial tactics" or "strategy choices" that are the exclusive domain of trial counsel. "This is 
6 an area where we will not second guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, 
7 ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. 
8 Larkin, l 02 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1981 ); see also State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425, 
9 426, 546 P.2d 380, 381 (1976). 
1 O Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial 
11 counsel were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of 
12 professionally competent assistance." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 
13 1026 - 1027 (Ct. App. 1991); See Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 695. 
14 I 1. Witness Rudy Bargi. 
15 Witness Rudy Bargi was not called at trial. At trial, trial counsel represented to the Court 
I 6 that she had spoken to Bargi and that he did not remember the events very well. In fact, she 
I 7 represented to the Court that Bargi was "incoherent." While Johnson "disputes" this, he presents 
18 no affidavits from Bargi that in fact he did remember the incident or that he could have testified 
19 that Johnson had to drive the vehicle that night. Without that evidence, the Court finds Johnson 
20 cannot establish that his testimony would have changed the trial's outcome. Therefore, the Court 
21 finds this allegation does not support post-conviction relief. 
22 2. Witness Tonya McKurcher. 
23 Johnson recognizes McKurcher died before his trial and, therefore, was unavailable to 
24 testify. While Johnson concedes that McKurcher had spoken with the prosecutor's office, he does 
25 not support his claim with what evidence she may have given. Like the other witness, in order to 
26 support an ineffective assistance of counsel, it is not enough to allege a failure to adequately 
27 investigate without proving what that investigation would have revealed because Johnson must 
28 demonstrate prejudice to succeed. Without that evidence, the Court finds Johnson cannot establish 
29 that her information would have changed the trial's outcome. Therefore, the Court finds this 
30 allegation does not support post-conviction relief. 
~1 
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B. Trial Counsel's failure to object to certain evidence does not support 
post-conviction relief. 
Johnson claims that his trial counsel failed to effectively assist him at trial in objecting to 
evidence that was inadmissible or prejudicial, to wit: 
a. failing to adequately object to Officer Hancock's testimony with 
regard to accuracy and scientific validity of HGN testing results consistent 
with a .15 blood alcohol content and the presence of benzodiazepine type 
drugs. 
b. failing to challenge the scientific basis and assertion by the state that 
horizontal gaze nystagmus can only be caused by ''three drug categories plus 
one rare disease." 
c. failing to adequately object to and exclude evidence of the 
defendant's attempted guilty plea of November 14, 2007. 
d. failing to object to the impeachment of the defendant with secondary 
blood testing results although the defendant did not dispute the result of .15 
on direct testimony. 
e. failing to object to cross examination regarding prior court 
proceedings, tactical and strategic conversations with counsel, and the 
timeliness of raising the necessity defense "before last Friday.·• 
f. failing to object to the jury instructions on the necessity defense. 
g. failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding the defendant's 
guilty plea. 
As discussed above, a trial counsel's manner of conducting cross-examination and lack of 
objection to the so-called damaging testimony fall within "trial tactics" or "strategy choices" that 
are the exclusive domain of trial counsel. It will not be second guessed "without evidence of 
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective 
evaluation." Larkin, 102 Idaho at 234, 628 P.2d at 1068; Elisondo, 97 Idaho at 426, 546 P.2d at 
381. 
Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial 
counsel were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of 
professionally competent assistance." Chapman, 120 Idaho at 469-470, 816 P.2d at 1026- 1027; 
Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 695. 
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C. Johnson presented no evidence that bis appellate counsel was ineffective. 
2 Johnson simply complains without any further discussion that "Appellate counsel did not 
3 provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
4 Constitution. Appellate counsel failed to raise any challenge to any of the evidentiary rulings 
5 identified in Count 2 of this Petition." 
6 Therefore, the Court intends to dismiss this claim; Johnson is not entitled to 
7 post-conviction relief. 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
2. The failure to move for an acquittal at the end of the State's case did not fall below 
an objective standard of reasonableness and Johnson was not prejudiced by the 
failure. 
Johnson claims that his trial counsel's failure to move the Court to acquit him at the end of 
the State's case fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and concludes without any 
evidence that this changed the outcome of his case. However, he presented no evidence that such 
a motion, even if made, would have been granted. 
In a post-conviction proceeding challenging an attorney's failure to pursue a motion in the 
underlying criminal action, the court properly may consider the probability of success of the 
motion in question in determining whether the attorney's inactivity constituted incompetent 
1 7 
• perfonnance. Sanchez v. State, 127 Idaho 709, 713, 905 P.2d 642, 646 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing 
18 Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 637 (Ct. App. 1993)). Where the alleged 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
deficiency is counsel's failure to file a motion, a conclusion that the motion, if pursued, would not 
have been granted by the trial court, is generally determinative of both prongs of the test. Id. at 
158-59, 857 P.2d at 637-38. If the motion lacked merit and would have been denied, counsel 
ordinarily would not be deficient for failing to pursue it, and, concomitantly, the petitioner could 
not have been prejudiced by the want of his pursuit. Id. 
In this case, the Court finds it would never have granted a motion to acquit; such a motion 
would have lacked merit. In fact, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on appeal, 
making it clear that there was substantial evidence to support the jury verdict. Therefore, his trial 
counsel was not deficient for failing to pursue it, and, therefore, Johnson was not prejudiced by the 
failure to pursue such a motion. This claim does not entitle Johnson to post-conviction relief. 
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3. The failure to call Travis Anderson does not support post-conviction relief. 
2 Johnson further claims in his Supplement that his counsel was ineffective by failing to call 
3 a witness, Travis Anderson, at trial or to interview him. Travis Anderson was in Officer White's 
4 patrol car at the time of the incident where he had been placed under arrest for driving under the 
5 influence. However, Johnson does not support his claim with admissible evidence of what Travis 
6 Anderson would have testified and never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue. 
7 The Court is not required to accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible 
8 evidence, or a Petitioner's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 
9 901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369,372 (Ct.App.1986). 
1 o Therefore, Johnson has failed to meet his burden and this claim is dismissed. 
11 b. Johnson's appellate counsel was not ineffective. 
12 Again Johnson simply alleges appellate counsel was ineffective in not arguing two issues 
13 on appeal: the Court erred in failing to include a limiting instruction in its final instructions even 
14 though the limiting instruction was given immediately following the witness' testimony and an 
15 exhibit (picture) admitted at trial contained improper commentary on the evidence. A criminal 
16 defendant's right to effective representation by counsel extends to all critical stages of the 
17 proceedings, including appeal. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 
18 2001); Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356,359,883 P.2d 714,717 (Ct. App. 1994); Flores v. State, 
19 104 Idaho 191, 194, 657 P .2d 488, 491 (Ct. App. 1983). Appellate counsel, however, is not 
20 required to raise every conceivable issue. See Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 
21 1181 (1988). Rather, appellate counsel is required only to make a conscientious examination of 
22 the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 
23 115, 119, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 1997). 
24 The Supreme Court of the United States has held that if a state has created appellate courts 
25 as an integral part of the system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, as is 
26 the case in Idaho, a first appeal guaranteed as a matter of right is not adjudicated in accord with 
27 due process of law where the appellant does not have effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. 
28 Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985). In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court 
29 held that the petitioner was denied due process at the appellate level because his counsel failed to 
30 submit an appellate brief. The instant case is distinguishable. Unlike Anders, Johnson was not 
11 
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denied total access to the appellate process. His attorney made several arguments on his behalf 
Johnson has not shown he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to bring these additional 
arguments. As Justice Jackson has stated: 
The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower 
court committed error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors 
increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. 
Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 Temple L.Q. I I 5, I I 9 (1951) 
(quoted inJonesv. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745,753 (1983)). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States suggested in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 
107 (1982), that the failure to even make constitutional arguments does not render appellate 
1 O I counsel ineffective: "[T]he constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a 
1 1 competent attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every 
12 
13 
conceivable constitutional claim." Id at 133. In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 ( 1983), the 
Supreme Court held that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-
14 
· frivolous issue requested by defendant. 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
But as discussed above, the issues raised by Johnson are in fact frivolous and would not 
have changed the appellate court's decision. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above, the Court gives notice it intends to dismiss the Petition. Johnson and 
the State may reply to the Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 days. In light of his 
reply, if any, or any failure to reply, the Court may order the Petition dismissed, grant leave to file 
21 I an amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. NO AMENDMENTS 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
11 
MAY BE FILED WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
Dated this 12th day of October 2010. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TIMOTHY PAUL JOHNSON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
Case No. CV-PC-2010-10011 
ORDER DISMISSING 
PETmON AND AMENDED PETITION 
On May 21, 2010, the Petitioner, Timothy Johnson, filed a Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, pro se, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial 
misconduct, "Brady"1 violations, and illegal blood draw. Johnson requested the Court appoint 
counsel which the Court did on May 21, 2010. Johnson's counsel filed an Amended Petition that 
incorporated by reference Johnson's previous Petition. The Court conditionally dismissed the 
Amended Petition on October 13, 2010, giving the parties twenty (20) days to respond. 
On October 29, 2010, in response to the Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition, 
Johnson's counsel filed an objection challenging the Court's Conditional Dismissal of one of his 
allegations, the failure to investigate and subpoena a material fact witness, Rudy Bangi, and attached 
an affidavit from Rudy Bangi, allegedly prepared more than a year ago on February 4, 2009, in 
support. He also generally demanded an evidentiary hearing on the alleged failure to "make 
appropriate objection [sic] to inadmissible evidence and prejudicial comment by the prosecuting 
attorney" and then asserted that bec~use ''this evidence is unrebutted [sic] in the record" Johnson was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. He did not identify what the evidentiary hearing would encompass 
and continued to fail to identify what objections should have been made. Johnson's counsel also 
requested "an addition [sic] fourteen days to file an additional pro se response and objection to 
1 Brady \J. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 ( 1963). 
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dismissal of the claims contained in the original petition." Subsequently, Johnson filed a pro se 
rambling seventy-three (73) page, hand-written document that generally restated his earlier pro se 
Petition and claimed, among other things, that the transcripts were inaccurate. The Court struck his 
prose response on December 7, 2010. 
The Court also found that no evidentiary hearing was necessary and that Johnson had not 
presented any evidence that his trial counsel failed to investigate any witness or that the jury would 
have acquitted him but for the failure to call this witness. Therefore, by order dated December 7, 
2010, the Court dismissed the majority of Johnson's claims and again indicated its intention to 
dismiss Johnson's Petition and Amended Petition. Because the Court's reasoning was slightly 
different from the Court's reasoning presented in the Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing 
Petition, the Court gave Johnson and the State the opportunity to reply to the Court's notice of the 
10 ! proposed dismissal of the remaining claim within 20 days. 
Jl 
12 
13 
14 
JS 
16 ! 
Neither party responded and, therefore, the Court hereby dismisses both the Petition and the 
Amended Petition. 
ANALYSIS 
A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal, 
whichever is later. LC. §19-4902. The Court finds his Petition was timely filed. 
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post conviction relief, 
17 
: either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Idaho Code §19-4906(b) 
provides as follows: 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and 
the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention 
to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given 
an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence raises no issue of 
material fact, which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
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759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 
459 (0. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
Johnson never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue material to the Court's decision 
with regard to these dismissed claims. The only affidavit he filed in support contained no admissible 
evidence and only contained a series of conclusory allegations. The Court is not required to accept 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's 
conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994): Baruth 
v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). To the extent any factual 
allegations are not conclusory and are supported by admissible evidence, the Court has assumed the 
factual allegations true for the purposes of this Decision unless clearly not supported by the record. 
The Court is not required to accept a petitioner's claims as true where the record clearly 
demonstrates the facts as otherwise. 
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely disti net 
from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 
(2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, 
however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the 
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 
797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. Id. 
Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c).2 
Thus, the question on summary disposition is whether the application, affidavits and other 
evidence supporting the application allege facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 
P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1995). In other words, the application must present, or be accompanied by, 
admissible evidence supporting aJJegations, or the application will be deemed subject to dismissal. 
24 2 I.C.R. 57(c). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shall have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
25 
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Finally, "[i]f the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if 
the petitioner's allegations faiJ as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. 
State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 
803 (2007); Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Thus, the Court may summarily dismiss Johnson's Petition if the Court is satisfied he is not 
entitled to the relief he requests. After giving him the opportunity to respond to the Court's 
Conditional Dismissal, with the exception of the Bangi witness claim as discussed below, Johnson 
failed to introduce any additional evidence or legal analysis changing this Court's analysis. 
A. On December 7, 2010, the Court dismissed all the claims asserted in Johnson's 
original Petition as conclusory and unsupported. 
The Court found Johnson's original Petition was replete with unsupported conc1usory 
allegations. Many of his claims do not make sense or are expressly disproven by the record. For 
example, Johnson's speedy trial claims are unmistakably disproven by the record, and the Court 
dismisses them. Johnson clearly waived any speedy trial rights both in writing and orally in October 
2007. McKay, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700; Workman, 144 Jdaho at 523, 164 P.3d at 803; Stuart, 
118 Idaho at 869, 801 P.2d at 1220. In addition, the trial was continued more than once at his 
request. 
Likewise, his claims regarding the redaction of the arrest tape are dismissed; the Court only 
allowed the redaction of the tape upon stipulation of all counsel, including Johnson's trial counsel, to 
protect Johnson from statements regarding his extensive prior D.U.I. history. Moreover, the Court 
gave Johnson the opportunity to introduce the entire un-redacted version during his proffer in 
support of his necessity defense, and he did not ask the Court to allow its introduction. In addition, 
while Johnson complains about the jury instruction on necessity, the jury instruction given to the jury 
was the standard approved jury instruction on necessity and he does not indicate what was improper 
about it. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims asserted in his original post-conviction 
Petition as clearly disproven by the record: 
1. prosecutorial misconduct redacting audio tapes on her own -- the prosecutor 
did not redact the tapes on her own. Trial counsel was given a copy to review 
and approve prior to trial. 
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2. speedy trial claims - Johnson waived his right to speedy trial orally and in 
writing. 
3. any claims regarding the propriety of the necessity instruction - Johnson has 
failed to explain what was wrong with the approved instruction. 
Likewise, the Court dismisses those claims where Johnson failed to identify what statements 
or what jury instructions were in error or how they adversely affected his case. ln response to this 
Court's Conditional Dismissal, he failed to cure the problems identified by the Court. Therefore, the 
Court dismisses those claims that are merely conclusory or unsupported by admissible evidence, 
including the following: 
1. "failure to continue trial, mental health evaluation" -- Johnson failed to 
identify what facts support his conclusory claim. 
2. "prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, unlawful re-testing of blood evidence, 
chain of custody, after discovery was closed and late disclosure of BAC 
evidence, and expert witness Susan Williams" -- Johnson failed to identify 
what facts support his conclusory claim. 
3. "denied a fair trial, erroneous exclusion of all defense witnesses and evidence, 
including eye witness testimony" -- Johnson failed to identify what facts 
support his conclusory claim, what defense witnesses were excluded or 
what they would have added to the case. 
4. "judicial misconduct vigilanti [sic] Court justice, Judge being Judge, 
Prosecutor, Jury" -- Johnson failed to identify what facts support his 
conclusory claim. 
5. "Bias judge" -- Johnson failed to identify what constituted bias and what 
facts suppo~t his conclusory claim. 
6. "Court allowing State witness to stay in Court room to hear testimony of other 
witnesses after exclusion motion (BPD Casy [sic] Handcuff [sic])" - The 
State is entitled to have a representative sit at counsel table. 
7. "" "lying to the jury, confusing the jury of location of arrest - stating accross 
[sic] the street from WINCO store" - The Court has been unable to find 
this in the record -- Johnson failed to support this allegation. 
8. "tweek.ing [sic] the necessity defense instruction" -- Johnson failed to 
identify how the necessity defense instruction was ''tweeked" - it is the 
I.C.J.I. 
9. "prejudicial statements pros. closing arguments" - Johnson failed to identify 
what prejudicial statements were made in dosing. 
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10. "failure to rebutt [sic] pre-sentence report" -- Johnson failed to identify what 
his counsel should have rebutted in the pre-sentence report or how it 
would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
11. "denial of witnesses at sentencing" - Johnson failed to identify what 
witnesses he would have presented during sentencing, what they would 
have added and how that would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
12. "acculmutive [sic] ~ doctrine" - Johnson failed to support this 
conclusory allegation or to explain what amounts to cumulative error. 
13. "transcript tampering" Johnson failed to identify what was wrong in the 
transcript. 
14. "Failure to investigate a viable defense, failure to contact defense witnesses, 
failure to supeona [sic] defense witnesses, eye witnesses and expert witnesses" 
- Johnson failed to identify what defense should have been investigated, 
what witnesses3 were not contacted or subpoenaed and what expert 
witnesses should have been hired. Johnson failed to support his 
conclusory allegations with any admissible evidence. 4 
15. "Failure to file appropriate motions, suppression motions, fact and speedy trial 
dismissal motions" -- Johnson failed to support these conclusory 
a1legations or identify what motions should have been fiJed or how they 
would have changed the outcome. Furthermore, as indicated below, 
Johnson specifically waived his right to speedy trial. 
16. "Failure to object to simple matters of law, helping the State in a conviction, 
recieving [sicJ judicial monitary [sic] bribes" - Johnson failed to support 
these conclusory aUegations or identify what objections should have been 
made or how the objections would have changed the outcome. Johnson 
provided no support for his accusation of bribes. 
3 With the exception of the Bangi witness claims. 
4 While this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-conviction relief, Vick v. State, 131 Idaho 
121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial 
counsel's failure to procure expert witnesses, the accused "must assert facts that would have been discovered by 
additional investigation and should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts 
had been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. 
Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 793, 948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(emphasis added)). In the instant matter, Johnson presented no 
facts that such an expert would have presented exculpatory evidence and presented no expert testimony. In order to 
create a valid claim, Johnson must present the Court with what an expert would have found and what evidence would 
have been produced. Otherwise, the Court is left to speculate as to any prejudicial impact on the outcome due to trial 
counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. ld. Thus, even if Johnson produced evidence at an evidentiary hearing that 
everything he says is true, he is also required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence which includes expert 
testimony, that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged deficiency; prejudice is shown by demonstrating the outcome 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Ramirez, 119 Idaho at 1041, 812 P.2d at 755. 
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17. "forced blood draw" - "denied the right to atty rep, upon arrest" - Johnson 
continues to fail to understand that a person who drives a motor vehicle 
on highways in Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary 
testing to determine concentration of alcohol or other intoxicants, so long 
as the peace officer making the request for testing has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of such substances. I.C. § 18-
8002(1)5; Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 65 P.3d 534 (2003). This 
implied consent includes the right to have a suspect's blood drawn. See 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). Furthermore, the 
implied consent statute in I.C. § 18-8002(2)6 clearly provides that a 
person suspected of driving while intoxicated does not have the right to 
consult with attorney before submitting to evidentiary testing. See also 
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P.3d 257 (2002). 
18. "Prosecuting attorney investigator prosecutorial misconduct, witho]ding [sic] 
evidence information" - Johnson failed to identify the evidence he claims 
was withheld.7 
Moreover, to the extent these claims could have been raised on appeal and were not; they are waived. 
I.C. § 19-4901(b); See Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 
1989) (citing LC.§ l9-4901(b)). 
Therefore, the Court dismissed the remaining claims made in the 01iginal Petition because 
they could have been raised on appeal. Id. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims 
made in the original Petition: 
I. 
2. 
"fundamental error, miscarriage of justice" 
"unlawful bill of attainder law" statutory enhancements 
5 I.C. § 18-8002( l ). Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section I 8-8004, Idaho Code. 
and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances. provided 
that such testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has 
been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, or section I 8-8006, Idaho Code. 
6 LC. § 18-8002(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to such evidentiary 
testing. 
7 Because Johnson failed to show what information or evidence was destroyed or the exculpatory nature of the 
information allegedly destroyed, he cannot establish a right to its disclosure or production. The Court is not required to 
accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's conclusions of law. 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 
P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. I 986). Therefore, dismissal of Johnson's Brady claims is proper. 
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3. "disproportionate sentence," "unconstitutionally excessive" 
Moreover, a claim that a sentence is unduly harsh, excessive or disproportionate affords no basis for 
post-conviction relief unless the sentence is illegal; Johnson makes no claim that the sentence was 
illegal. I.C. § 19-4901(a); Evans v. State, 127 Idaho 662, 664, 904 P.2d 574, 576 (Ct. App. 1995); 
Ruiz v. State, 122 Idaho 222, 223, 832 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Ct. App. 1992); Williams v. State, 113 
Idaho 685,687, 747 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1987). Post-conviction relief proceedings are designed to 
permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal sentence; they are not intended as a 
means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the trial court exercised its 
sentencing discretion. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,__, 960 P.2d 738,741 (1998). 
Finally, on appeal, Johnson actually challenged his sentence and the Court of Appeals 
affinned it. Therefore, he cannot raise it on post-conviction because when legal issues are decided in 
a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising 
them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, _, 966 P.2d I, 23 
(1998); State v. Fetterly, 115 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701,703 (1988). Post-conviction relief is not 
available merely to challenge a judge's exercise of discretion. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 
833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 1989); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374, 376 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
B. On December 7, 2010, the Court dismissed the ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims asserted in the Amended Petition and gave notice of its intent to dismiss 
any claim associated with witness Bangi. The Court now dismisses the 
remaining claim. 
Like his failure to support his claims made in the original Petition, Johnson failed to support 
any of his new claims in the Amended Petition and in response to the Court's Conditional Dismissal 
failed to provide any additional support or facts. In the Amended Petition, Johnson made ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims against both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel. As set forth 
below, with the exception of the Bangi witness claim, the Court dismissed the remaining claims 
found in the Amended Petition on December 7, 2010. 
In an ineffective counsel claim, to establish a deficiency, an applicant must establish two 
things. The applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. Stale, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
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(1988); Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387,390 (Ct. App. 2001). However, there is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of "professional 
assistance" and will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. 
In addition, an applicant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was 
prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency; prejudice is shown by demonstrating the outcome would 
,have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); Ramirez v. State, 119 
Idaho 1037, 1041, 812 P.2d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 1991). Further, "[t]o establish prejudice, the 
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 
787, 792 (2002) (quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct. App. 2001)). It 
is against this backdrop that the Court analyzes alJ of Johnson's ineffective counsel claims. 
Contrary to Johnson's claim, defense counsel is not required to raise every conceivable issue. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,765,760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Idaho appellate courts will not 
second guess strategic and tactical decisions of trial counsel whether to pursue a particular issue or 
theory, unless there is "evidence that the decision was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 13 
P.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 634, 639 
(Ct.App.1993)). 
1. Johnson presented no admissible evidence that his trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate his necessity defense by obtaining what McKurcher may 
have told the prosecutor and the record disproves his claim. 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c). Without any evidence, 
Johnson simply concludes that his counsel failed "to conduct an adequate investigation into whether 
a necessity defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of witnesses ... 8 
8 The Court addresses Rudy Bangi below. 
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Tonya McKurcher." Johnson concedes McKurcher died before his trial and, therefore, was 
unavailable to testify. While Johnson simply claims without evidence that McKurcher spoke with 
the prosecutor's office, he does not support his claim with what evidence she may have given and the 
record does not support his claim. Like other witnesses, in order to support an ineffective assistance 
of counsel, it is not enough to allege a failure to adequately investigate without proving what that 
investigation would have revealed because Johnson must demonstrate prejudice to succeed. Without 
that evidence, the Court finds Johnson cannot establish that McKurcher's information would have 
changed the trial's outcome. 
Furthermore, the transcript indicates that Johnson's trial counsel actually investigated 
Johnson's claim that McKurcher spoke with the prosecutor and found that she had not been 
interviewed by the prosecutor. At the status conference held February 13, 2008, his trial counsel 
informed the Court as follows: 
HESSING: your honor, there is - just briefly, there was one - there was a person 
in the vehicle. There were actually two people in the vehicle. One of the persons has 
- she's since died. She's deceased. Before she passed away she informed Mr. 
Johnson that she had an Ada County - an investigator from the Ada County 
Prosecutor's Officer come out to speak with her at her home. And he told her that she 
should let Mr. Johnson know that he should request that report because it would be 
helpful to him. This is information that he's given to me. I have spoken to Miss 
Longhurst and she indicated that she doesn't have any record of an investigator going 
out to talk to her. 
So I just did want to p]ace on the record that Mr. Johnson has informed me of this and 
I have looked into it and I haven't been able to find anything. 
See Tr. p. 42-43. 
A defendant has the burden of identifying the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 
to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 695. As 
to a trial counsel's choice of witnesses, her manner of conducting cross-examination, and her lack of 
objection to the so-called damaging testimony, these points fall within "trial tactics" or "strategy 
choices" that are the exclusive domain of trial counsel. "This is an area where we will not second 
guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (1981); see also State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425,426,546 P.2d 380,381 (1976). 
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Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial counsel 
were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026 - 1027 (Ct. 
App. 1991); See Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 695. Therefore, the Court finds this allegation does 
not support post-conviction relief and dismisses it. 
2. Trial counsel's alleged failure to object to certain evidence does not support 
post-conviction relief. 
Johnson claims that his trial counsel failed to effectively assist him at trial by failing to object 
to evidence that was inadmissible or prejudicial, to wit: 
a. failing to adequately object to Officer Hancock's testimony with regard 
to accuracy and scientific validity of HGN testing results consistent with a .15 
blood alcohol content and the presence of benzodiazepine type drugs. 
b. failing to challenge the scientific basis and assertion by the state that 
horizontal gaze nystagmus can only be caused by "three drug categories plus 
one rare disease." 
c. failing to adequately object to and exclude evidence of the defendant's 
attempted guilty plea of November 14, 2007. 
d. failing to object to the impeachment of the defendant with secondary 
blood testing results although the defendant did not dispute the result of .15 on 
direct testimony. 
e. failing to object to cross examination regarding prior court 
proceedings, tactical and strategic conversations with counsel, and the 
timeliness of raising the necessity defense "before last Friday." 
f. failing to object to the jury instructions on the necessity defense. 
g. failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding the defendant's 
guilty plea. 
As discussed above, a trial counsel's manner of conducting cross-examination and lack of 
objection to the so-called damaging testimony fall within "trial tactics" or "strategy choices" that are 
the exclusive domain of trial counsel. It will not be second guessed "without evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Larkin, 102 Idaho at 234, 628 P.2d at 1068; Elisondo, 97 Idaho at 426, 546 P.2d at 381. 
Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial counsel 
were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of professionally 
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competent assistance." Chapman, 120 Idaho at 469-470, 816 P.2d at 1026- 1027; Strickland, supra 
466 U.S. at 695. 
3. Johnson presented no evidence that his appellate counsel was ineffective. 
Johnson simply complains without any further discussion that "Appellate counsel did not 
provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Appellate counsel failed to raise any challenge to any of the evidentiary rulings 
identified in Count 2 of this Petition." A criminal defendant's right to effective representation by 
counsel extends to all critical stages of the proceedings, including appeal. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 
280,285, 32 P.3d 672,677 (Ct. App. 2001); Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356,359,883 P.2d 714, 717 
(Ct. App. 1994); Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 194, 657 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1983). Appellate 
counsel, however, is not required to raise every conceivable issue. See Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Rather, appellate counsel is required only to make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 1 19, 937 P.2d 427, 431 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that if a state has created appellate courts as 
an integral part of the system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, as is the 
case in Idaho, a first appeal guaranteed as a matter of right is not adjudicated in accord with due 
process of law where the appellant does not have effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387 (1985). In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the 
petitioner was denied due process at the appellate level because his counsel failed to submit an 
appellate brief. The instant case is distinguishable. Unlike Anders, Johnson was not denied total 
access to the appellate process. His attorney made several arguments on his behalf. Johnson has not 
shown he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to bring these additional arguments. As 
Justice Jackson has stated: 
The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower 
court committed error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors 
increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. 
Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951) 
(quoted in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 (1983)). 
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Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States suggested in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 
(1982), that the failure to even make constitutional arguments does not render appellate counsel 
ineffective: "[T]he constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent 
attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable 
constitutional claim." Id. at 133. In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Supreme Court held 
that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue requested 
by defendant. 
But as discussed above, the issues raised by Johnson are in fact frivolous and would not have 
changed the appellate court's decision. Therefore, appellate counsel's representation did not fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and the Court dismisses this claim. 
4. Johnson's remaining claims related to witness Bangi are dismissed. 
Johnson's appointed counsel on post-conviction filed an Amended Petition that further 
alleges his trial counsel were ineffective as follows: 
1. Failure to investigate the factual and legal defenses, including, without 
limitation, the failure to conduct an adequate investigation into whether a necessity 
defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of witnesses 
Rudy Bargi9 [sic] .... 
2. Witness Rudy Bargi [sic] was not called at trial. Although trial counsel 
represented to the court that Mr. Bargi [sic] did not remember the events very well 
and was "incoherent" the Petitioner disputes this characterization and alleges that his 
trial attorney should have subpoenaed this material trial witness. The Petitioner was 
prejudiced by the failure of counsel to call a witness that could have testified as to the 
medical condition of McKurcher on the date of the arrest. 
During the status conference held on December 1, 2010, Johnson's counsel asserted that there 
was no evidence in the record that Johnson's trial counsel had made any representations to the Court 
regarding her investigation of the propriety of calling Rudy Bangi at trial. Based on his 
representations, the Court set an evidentiary hearing. However, as discussed in its Order dated 
December 7, 2010, the Court found no evidentiary hearing was necessary and vacated that hearing. 
9 Bangi. 
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After the December 1st hearing, the Court instructed the in-court clerk to review the minutes 
in the underlying case to determine when trial counsel informed the Court witness Rudy Bangi was 
incoherent and had little to add. After the clerk reviewed those minutes he found that the discussion 
occurred just before the jury was brought into Court for voir dire. The discussion with counsel and 
the voir dire was not transcribed. The Court attached a recording of that in-court exchange to the 
December 7, 2010, Order as Exhibit A, and made it part of the court record on post-conviction. 
As the recording demonstrated, the parties discussed the propriety of Johnson's necessity 
defense, and during that discussion, the Court indicated that before it would allow that defense to be 
presented to the jury, Johnson must make a proffer. During that discussion, Johnson's trial counsel 
informed the Court that she had contacted one of the passengers, Rudy Bangi, several times and that 
when she spoke with him he appeared incoherent. She told the Court that he told her he did not 
remember that night's events but that she would continue to try and contact him. 
HESSING: Your honor may I ask the Court when it would like that proffer? 
COURT: Well we're not going to do that right now we are about ready to bring 
in the jury. And that proffer will have to be through his testimony because my 
understanding is that no evidence was provided by way of discovery to the State. Is 
that correct? 
HESSING: Your honor that is correct. I can let the Court know however that I 
was in contact with a person that was listed in the State's police reports. I have yet to 
be able to speak to him because every time I've called him he has been incoherent and 
unable to talk to me. I'm not sure how old he is. I know he is fairly old. I have a 
phone number for him but I was unable to get an address to maybe have somebody go 
out and talk to him. and so at this point, I'm unsure that he is an appropriate witness. 
However, I was able to elicit some - he says he doesn't remember. And I was told by 
Mr. Johnson that he didn't remember that evening. Which is why I didn't try to 
contact him any sooner. I actually - when I did contact him he said he didn't really 
remember the evening. And I said well do you remember this and do you remember 
that and I was unable to understand his responses. But at one point he answered "yes" 
when I asked him if the other passenger in the vehicle had been driving at one point. I 
don't know how helpfu I that' II be if the rest of his answers are incoherent on the 
stand. I'm really at this point trying to find a time that I can - that he is coherent 
which I have been unable at this point. But I did want to let the Court know and the 
State know obviously if the State needs further time I understand that but I wouldn't 
be calling if I did until at least late Thursday that is my understanding or Friday which 
I believe would give the Court .... 
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The State strongly objected to Bangi's testimony and ultimately the Court ruled that this witness 
could not be called for late disclosure, noting that it appeared that he had no evidence to offer in any 
event. While the Court did exclude this witness, this exchange clearly demonstrates that trial 
counsel had investigated this witness and determined that he really could not add anything to the 
trial. 
The Court set February 20, 2008, to allow Johnson to present an offer of proof on his 
necessity defense. At that hearing, relevant to Bangi, after asking the Court to appoint new counsel, 
Johnson told the Court as follows: 
THE COURT: What witnesses are- those? 
THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Rudy Bangi. He was a passenger in the vehicle. Whether 
he has any testimony at all, whatever he has, may be helpful. I have no idea what he 
he's going to testify to, what he has going, I have no idea, and she wouldn't either, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, she's talked to him. She's indicated to this Court that she's 
spoken to him. and what she has indicated to this Court is he did not have a clear 
recollection of the events of that evening and that he was incoherent at times. So 
what testimony would- what else should she have done? 
*** 
Q: Did you feel comfortable leaving Miss McKurcher with Mr. Bangi? 
A: I didn't feel comfortable leaving either one of them. 
Q: Why not? 
A: Well, like I was stating, Mr. Bangi was kind of incoherent, he realJy didn't 
know what was going on, and Miss McKurcher was still in a state of not coming 
coherent to what was actually happening either. 
Tr. p. 203, Ins. 4-13 (emphasis added). 
Later in that hearing, while the State was arguing that the entire tapes should be played at trial 
because on Officer Short's tape, Officer Short asked "where are you coming from." And the tape 
showed Johnson and a female voice said "we're heading over to the WinCo." As the prosecutor 
pointed out: 
... The defendant and a female voice. I'm having a hard time with this huge medical 
emergency since she is coherent enough to talk and chitchat back and forth. And 
she's the one that said - and not in response to where are you going, where are you 
coming from, was the question that Officer Short asked. 
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Tr. p. 224, Ins. 3-11. 
It is true that witness Rudy Bangi was not called at trial. However, trial counsel represented 
to the Court that she had spoken to Bangi several times, clearly investigating this potential witness 
and that he did not remember the events very well. In fact, she represented to the Court that Bangi 
was "incoherent." Likewise, Johnson himself told the Court during his proffer that the night he 
claims this emergency justified a necessity defense, "Mr. Bangi was kind of incoherent, he really 
didn't know what was going on, .. " 
Johnson "disputed" this by presenting an affidavit from Bangi made in February 2009, almost 
a year after the trial indicating that in fact he did remember the incident and he could have testified 
that Johnson had to drive the vehicle that night. However, Bangi is now dead and cannot testify. 
Moreover, while the Court accepted this affidavit as true for the purposes of Johnson's Amended 
Petition, this did not change the Court's analysis. 
First, the record clearly shows that trial counsel did investigate the potential effectiveness of 
this witness and had made certain strategic decisions. As discussed above, a trial counsel's choice of 
witnesses falls within the area of tactical, or strategic decisions, as does counsel's presentation of 
evidence. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 724, 932 P.2d 348, 352 (1996). It will not be second 
guessed "without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Larkin, 102 Idaho at 234, 628 P.2d at 1068; 
Elisondo, 97 Idaho at 426, 546 P.2d at 381. The Court finds that there is no evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Second, assuming Bangi was coherent one year after trial and now recalled what even 
Johnson himself suggested during trial he did not know, this does not mean trial counsel was 
ineffective because it is not evidence that Bangi was actually coherent and remembered the incident 
at the time of trial. The Court noted that he is unavailable for an evidentiary hearing. 
Finally, Johnson did not meet the prejudice prong of Strickland because the tape recordings 
of the encounter between Johnson and Jaw enforcement clearly belie his story. As the prosecutor 
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noted a female, presumably McKurcher, 10 responded to the officer's questions and the officers 
released the car to her and apparently thought her capable of driving. It is unlikely that a jury would 
have been persuaded by any testimony from Bangi. 
CONCLUSION 
Therefore, the Court hereby dismisses both the Petition and Amended Petition. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this ih day of January 2011. 
10 There is no evidence any other female was present. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA 
TIMOTHY PAUL JOHNSON, Case No. CV-PC-2010-10011 
ORDER STRIKING MATERIAL FILED 
PRO SE, VACA TING EVIDENTIAR Y 
HEARING, DISMISSING AMENDED 
PETIDON, IN PART AND 
CONDITIONALLY DISMISSING THE 
REMAINING CLAIM 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
THE ST A TE OF IDAHO, 
Res ndent. 
On May 21, 2010, the Petitioner, Timothy Johnson, filed a Petition for Post Conviction 
Relief, pro se, alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, judicial 
misconduct, "Brady" 1 violations, and illegal blood draw. Johnson requested the Court appoint 
counsel which the Court did on May 21, 2010. Johnson is represented by counsel. Johnson's 
counsel filed an Amended Petition that incorporated by reference Johnson's previous Petition. The 
Court conditionally dismissed the Amended Petition on October 13, 2010, giving the parties twenty 
days to respond. 
On October 29, 2010, in response to the Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition, 
17 • Johnson's counsel filed an objection challenging the Court's Conditional Dismissal of one of his 
allegations, the failure to investigate and subpoena a material fact witness, Rudy Bangi, and attached 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
an affidavit from Rudy Bangi, allegedly prepared more than a year ago on February 4, 2009, in 
support. He also generally demanded an evidentiary hearing on the alleged failure to "make 
appropriate objection [sic] to inadmissible evidence and prejudicial comment by the prosecuting 
attorney" and then asserted that because "this evidence is unrebutted [sic] in the record" Johnson was 
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. He did not identify what the evidentiary hearing would encompass 
and continued to fail to identify what objections should have been made. Johnson's counsel also 
1 Brady v, Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). 
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requested "an addition [sic] fourteen days to file an additional pro se response and objection to 
dismissal of the claims contained in the original petition." Subsequently, Johnson filed a pro se 
rambling seventy-three (73) page, hand-written document that generally restates his earlier pro se 
Petition and claims, among other things, that the transcripts were inaccurate. 
In response, the Court ordered an evidentiary hearing be held on December 1, 2010, to 
consider this evidence and to allow this new witness, Rudy Bangi, to testify. However, at the 
December 1st hearing, Johnson's counsel presented a copy of Mr. Bangi's death certificate to the 
Court indicating Bangi died on July 4, 2010, and was therefore unavailable. At the hearing, the 
Court informed Johnson and his attorney that it would not consider the material he filed because he 
is represented by counsel and cannot both represent himself and have counsel. In addition, the Court 
set an evidentiary hearing for January 19, 2011, to allow counsel to present evidence on the sole 
issue of whether trial counsel had investigated and spoken to the witness, Rudy Bargi, because 
counsel asserted there was no evidence that she had properly investigated this witness. 
However, as discussed below and based on the attached recording, Ex. A, the Court now 
finds that no evidentiary hearing is necessary. Johnson has not presented any evidence that his trial 
counsel failed to investigate this witness or that the jury would have acquitted him but for the failure 
to call this witness. As discussed in more detail below, there is no evidence that Bangi was 
competent to testify at trial, regardless of whether this Court accepts his 2009 affidavit, or that he had 
an independent recollection of the events at the time of trial. Therefore, the Court vacates the 
evidemiary hearing, finding there is no dispute of any fact material to the Court's decision to dismiss 
the Amended Petition. The Court further indicates its intention to dismiss any claim related to the 
allegation that trial counsel failed to adequately investigate the potential assistance witness Bangi 
could provide at trial. Therefore, by this order, the Court is inrncating its intention to dismiss 
Johnson's Petition and Amended Petition. 
Because this reasoning is slightly different from the Court's reasoning presented in the 
Court's Order Conditionally Dismissing Petition, Johnson and the State may reply to the Court's 
notice of the proposed dismissal of this claim within 20 days. In light of his reply, if any, or any 
failure to reply, the Court may order the Petition and the Amended Petition dismissed, grant leave to 
file an amended application, or direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. Johnson may not 
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file an amended application without leave of court. If he wishes to amend his petition at this 
point, he must file the appropriate motion and a copy of the proposed amended petition. 
2 
As to the other claims made, the Court hereby dismisses them finding that the responses do 
3 not change the Court's analysis. Therefore, the Court will not entertain any new material as to the 
4 
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other claims. 
Finally, based on the following analysis, the Court also hereby strikes the material Johnson 
filed on his own finding that he cannot both represent himself and have counsel represent him. 
ANALYSIS 
I. THE COURT STRIKES THE MATERIAL JOHNSON FILED ON HIS OWN ON 
8 NOVEMBER 4, 2010. 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
Johnson is represented by counsel and has not asked the Court to allow him to represent 
himself. A defendant has no right to hybrid representation (a procedure in which a self-represented 
defendant conducts part of the proceeding and standby counsel conducts another part of the 
proceeding). Locks v. Sumner, 703 F.2d 403 (9th Cir. 1983); Cross v. U.S., 893 F.2d 1287 (11 th Cir. 
1990); Julius v. Johnson, 755 F.2d 1403, 1403-04 (I 1th Cir. 1985); United States v. Zielie, 734 F.2d 
1447, 1454 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1189 (1985); Raulerson v. Wainwright, 732 F.2d 
803, 808-09 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 966 (1984); United States v. Bowdach, 561 F.2d 
1160, 1176 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Shea, 508 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
847 (1975). The Court appointed counsel. 
The Jaw is clear. A court is not required to acknowledge pro se filings of defendant who is 
represented by attorney in prosecution because a criminal defendant does not have an absolute right 
to both self-representation and assistance of counsel. U.S. v. Bergman, 813 F.2d 1027 (9th Cir. 
1987); United States v. Halbert, 640 F.2d 1000, 1009 (9th Cir. 1981); U.S. v. Stanley, 2010 WL 
3611396 (10th Cir. 2010).2 Even a capital defendant's prose filings do not have to be considered 
where the defense counsel did not adopt the prose motion. Ault v. State, 2010 WL 3781991 (Fla. 
2010). With the exception of a defendant's prose motion to discharge his or her court-appointed 
2 The Court could include a string cite but declines to do so. 
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attorney, any pro se pleading that is not adopted by the defendant's counsel is unauthorized and a 
nullity. Id. 
The reasoning for such a rule is clear. By signing any pleadings, counsel certifies "that the 
attorney ... has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of the signer's knowledge, 
information, and belief after reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by 
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and 
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or 
needless increase in the cost of litigation." Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure Rule l l(a)(l). Especially 
in a post-conviction case, it is imperative that this practice be followed to prevent a petitioner from 
filing frivolous material where he is represented by counsel. 
Therefore, the Court strikes Johnson's pro se filings and will not consider them. Johnson 
shall not file any other documents prose. 
II. THE COURT DISMISSES THE AMENDED PETITION IN PART. 
A petition for Post Conviction Relief can be filed at any time within one year from the 
expiration of the time for appeal or from the determination of a proceeding following appeal, 
whichever is later. LC. § 19-4902. The Court finds his Petition was timely filed. 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of a petition for post conviction relief, 
either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own initiative. Idaho Code §19-4906(b) 
provides as fol lows: 
When a court is satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and 
the record, that the applicant is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose 
would be served by any further proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention 
to dismiss the application and its reasons for so doing. The applicant shall be given 
an opportunity to reply within 20 days to the proposed dismissal. 
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the petitioner's evidence raises no issue of 
material fact, which, if resolved in his favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. If such a 
factual issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 
759, 763, 819 P.2d 1159, 1163 (Ct. App. 1991); Hoover v. State, 114 Idaho 145, 146, 754 P.2d 458, 
459 (Ct. App. 1988); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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Johnson never filed any affidavits creating a factual issue material to the Court's decision 
with regard to these dismissed claims. The only affidavit he filed in support contained no admissible 
evidence and only contained a series of conclusory allegations. The Court is not required to accept 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's 
conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth 
v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). To the extent any factual 
allegations are not conclusory and are supported by admissible evidence, the Court has assumed the 
factual allegations true for the purposes of this Decision unless clearly not supported by the record. 
The Court is not required to accept a petitioner's claims as true where the record clearly 
demonstrates the facts as otherwise. 
An application for post-conviction relief is in the nature of a civil proceeding, entirely distinct 
from the underlying criminal proceeding. Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 798, 25 P.3d 110, 111 
(2001). An application for post-conviction relief differs from a complaint in an ordinary civil action, 
however, because an application must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the 
claim" that would suffice for a complaint under LR.C.P. 8(a)(l). Hernandez v. State, 133 Idaho 794, 
797, 992 P.2d 789, 792 (Ct. App. 1999). The application must present or be accompanied by 
admissible evidence supporting its a11egations, or the application will be subject to dismissal. Id. 
Finally, a petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. LC.R. 57(c).3 
Thus, the question on summary disposition is whether the application, affidavits and other 
evidence supporting the application allege facts which, if true, would entitle the applicant to relief. 
Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738, 740 (1998); Martinez v. State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 
P.2d 488, 492 (Ct. App. 1995). In olher words, the application must present. or be accompanied by, 
admissible evidence supporting allegations, or the application wilJ be deemed subject to dismissal. 
Finally, "[i]f the record conclusively disproves an essential element of a post-conviction claim," or if 
the petitioner's allegations fail as a matter of law, summary dismissal is appropriate. McKay v. 
24 3 I.C.R. 57 ( c ). Burden of Proof. The petitioner shal I have the burden of proving the petitioner's grounds for relief by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
25 
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State, 148 Idaho 567, 225 P.3d 700 (2010); Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 
803 (2007); Stuart v. State, l 18 Idaho 865,869,801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990). 
Thus, the Court may summarily dismiss Johnson's Petition if the Court is satisfied he is not 
entitled to the relief he requests. After giving him the opportunity to respond to the Court's 
Conditional Dismissal, with the exception of the Bangi witness claim as discussed below, Johnson 
failed to introduce any additional evidence or legal analysis changing this Court's analysis. 
A. The Court dismisses alJ the claims asserted in Johnson's original Petition as 
conclusory and unsupported. 
Johnson's original Petition is replete with unsupported conclusory allegations and the Court 
may dismiss on that basis alone. Many of the claims do not make sense or are expressly disproven 
by the record. For example, Johnson's speedy trial claims are unmistakably disproven by the record, 
and the Court dismisses them. Johnson clearly waived any speedy trial rights both in writing and 
orally in October 2007. McKay, 148 Idaho 567,225 P.3d 700; Workman, 144 Idaho at 523, 164 P.3d 
at 803; Stuart, 118 Idaho at 869, 801 P.2d at 1220. In addition, the trial was continued more than 
once at his request. 
Likewise, his claims regarding the redaction of the arrest tape are dismissed; the Court only 
allowed the redaction of the tape upon stipulation of all counsel, including Johnson's trial counsel, to 
protect Johnson from statements regarding his extensive prior D.U.I. history. Moreover, the Court 
gave Johnson the opportunity to introduce the entire un-redacted version during his proffer in 
support of his necessity defense, and he did not ask the Court to allow its introduction. In addition, 
while Johnson complains about the jury instruction on necessity, the jury instruction given to the jury 
was the standard approved jury instruction on necessity and he does not indicate what was improper 
about it. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims asserted in his original post-conviction 
Petition as clearly disproven by the record: 
1. prosecutorial misconduct redacting audio tapes on her own -- the prosecutor 
did not redact the tapes on her own. Trial counsel was given a copy to review 
and approve prior to trial. 
2. speedy trial claims - Johnson waived his right to speedy trial orally and in 
writing. 
3. any claims regarding the propriety of the necessity instruction Johnson has 
failed to explain what was wrong with the approved instruction. 
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Likewise, the Court dismisses those claims where Johnson failed to identify what statements 
or what jury instructions were in error or how they adversely affected his case. In response to this 
Court's Conditional Dismissal, he failed to cure the problems identified by the Court. Therefore, the 
Court dismisses those claims that are merely conclusory or unsupported by admissible evidence, 
including the following: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
IO. 
"failure to continue trial, mental health evaluation" -- Johnson failed to 
identify what facts support his conclusory claim. 
"prosecutorial and judicial misconduct, unlawful re-testing of blood evidence, 
chain of custody, after discovery was closed and late disclosure of BAC 
evidence, and expert witness Susan Williams" -- Johnson failed to identify 
what facts support his conclusory claim. 
"denied a fair trial, erroneous exclusion of all defense witnesses and evidence, 
including eye witness testimony" -- Johnson failed to identify what facts 
support his conclusory claim, what defense witnesses were excluded or 
what they would have added to the case. 
"judicial misconduct vigilanti (sic] Court justice, Judge being Judge, 
Prosecutor, Jury" -- Johnson failed to identify what facts support his 
conclusory claim. 
"Bias judge" -- Johnson failed to identify what constituted bias and what 
facts support his conclusory claim. 
"Court allowing State witness to stay in Court room to hear testimony of other 
witnesses after exclusion motion (BPD Casy [sic] Handcuff [sic])" The 
State is entitled to have a representative sit at counsel table. 
" " "lying to the jury, confusing the jury of location of arrest - stating accross 
[sic] the street from WINCO store" The Court has been unable to find 
this in the record -- Johnson failed to support this allegation. 
"tweeking [sic] the necessity defense instruction" -- Johnson failed to 
identify how the necessity defense instruction was "tweeked" - it is the 
I.CJ.I. 
"prejudicial statements pros. closing arguments" - Johnson failed to identify 
what prejudicial statements were made in closing. 
"failure to rebutt [sic] pre-sentence report" -- Johnson failed to identify what 
his counsel should have rebutted in the pre-sentence report or how it 
would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
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11. "denial of witnesses at sentencing" - Johnson failed to identify what 
witnesses he would have presented during sentencing, what they would 
have added and how that would have changed the sentencing outcome. 
12. "acculmutive [sic] error doctrine" - Johnson failed to support this 
conclusory allegation or to explain what amounts to cumulative error. 
13. "transcript tampering" -- Johnson failed to identify what was wrong in the 
transcript. 
14. "Failure to investigate a viable defense, failure to contact defense witnesses, 
failure to supeona [sic] defense witnesses, eye witnesses and expert witnesses" 
- Johnson failed to identify what defense should have been investigated, 
what witnesses4 were not contacted or subpoenaed and what expert 
witnesses should have been hired. Johnson failed to support his 
conclusory allegations with any admissible evidence. 5 
15. "Failure to file appropriate motions, suppression motions, fact and speedy trial 
dismissal motions" -- Johnson failed to support these conclusory 
allegations or identify what motions should have been filed or how they 
would have changed the outcome. Furthermore, as indicated below, 
Johnson specifically waived his right to speedy trial. 
16. "Failure to object to simple matters of law, helping the State in a conviction, 
recieving [sic] judicial monitary [sic] bribes" - Johnson failed to support 
these conclusory allegations or identify what objections should have been 
made or how the objections would have changed the outcome. Johnson 
provided no support for his accusation of bribes. 
17. "forced blood draw" - "denied the right to atty rep, upon arrest" - Johnson 
continues to fail to understand that a person who drives a motor vehicle 
4 With the exception of the Bangi witness claims. 
5 While this contention could properly be considered in an application for post-conviction relief, Vick v. State, I 3 I Idaho 
121, 952 P.2d 1257 (Ct. App. 1998), in order to succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on trial 
counsel's failure to procure expert witnesses, the accused "must assert facts that would have been discovered by 
additional investigation and should offer expert testimony that would have been produced if the funds to hire the experts 
had been requested." Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 405, 973 P.2d 749, 757 (Ct. App. 1999) (quoting State v. 
Porter, 130 Idaho 772,793,948 P.2d 127, 146 (1997)(emphasis added)). In the instant matter, Johnson presented no 
facts that such an expert would have presented exculpatory evidence and presented no expert testimony. In order to 
create a valid claim, Johnson must present the Court with what an expert would have found and what evidence would 
have been produced. Otherwise, the Court is left to speculate as to any prejudicial impact on the outcome due to trial 
counsel's alleged ineffective assistance. Id. Thus, even if Johnson produced evidence at an evidentiary hearing that 
everything he says is true, he is also required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence which includes expert 
testimony. that he was prejudiced by his attorney's alleged deficiency; prejudice is shown by demonstrating the outcome 
would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-92; Ramirez, 119 Idaho at 1041, 812 P.2d at 755. 
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18. 
on highways in Idaho is deemed to have given consent to evidentiary 
testing to determine concentration of alcohol or other intoxicants, so long 
as the peace officer making the request for testing has reasonable 
grounds to believe that the person has been driving or in physical control 
of a vehicle while under the influence of such substances. I.C. § 18-
8002(1)6; Thompson v. State, 138 Idaho 512, 65 P.3d 534 (2003). This 
implied consent includes the right to have a suspect's blood drawn. See 
State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 300, 160 P.3d 739 (2007). Furthermore, the 
implied consent statute in I.C. § 18-8002(2)7 clearly provides that a 
person suspected of driving while intoxicated does not have the right to 
consult with an attorney before submitting to evidentiary testing. See also 
Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, 41 P .3d 257 (2002). 
"Prosecuting attorney investigator prosecutorial misconduct, witholding [sic] 
evidence information" - Johnson failed to identify the evidence he claims 
was withheld.8 
Moreover, to the extent these claims could have been raised on appeal and were not; they are waived. 
LC. § 19-490l(b); See Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 832-33, 780 P.2d 153, 154-55 (Ct. App. 
l989)(citing LC.§ 19-490l(b)). 
The Court dismisses the remaining claims made in the original Petition because they could 
have been raised on appeal. Id. Therefore, the Court dismisses the following claims made in the 
original Petition: 
I. "fundamental error, miscarriage of justice" 
2. "unlawful bill of attainder law" statutory enhancements 
3. "disproportionate sentence," "unconstitutionally excessive" 
6 LC. § 18-8002(1). Any person who drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in this state shall be deemed 
to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for concentration of alcohol as defined in section 18-8004, Idaho Code. 
and to have given his consent to evidentiary testing for the presence of drugs or other intoxicating substances, provided 
that such testing is administered at the request of a peace officer having reasonable grounds to believe that person has 
been driving or in actual physical control of a motor vehicle in violation of the provisions of section 18-8004, Idaho 
Code, or section 18-8006, Idaho Code. 
7 LC. § 18-8002(2) Such person shall not have the right to consult with an attorney before submitting to such evidentiary 
testing. 
8 Because Johnson failed to show what information or evidence was destroyed or the exculpatory nature of the 
information allegedly destroyed, he cannot establish a right to its disclosure or production. The Court is not required to 
accept mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or accept a petitioner's conclusions of law. 
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct. App. 1994); Baruth v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 
P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App. 1986). Therefore, dismissal of Johnson's Brady claims is proper. 
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Moreover, a claim that a sentence is unduly harsh, excessive or disproportionate affords no basis for 
post-conviction relief unless the sentence is illegal; Johnson makes no claim that the sentence was 
illegal. LC.§ 19-490l(a); Evans v. State, 127 Idaho 662, 664, 904 P.2d 574, 576 (Ct. App. 1995); 
Ruiz v. State, 122 Idaho 222, 223, 832 P.2d 1157, 1159 (Ct. App. 1992); Williams v. State, 113 
Idaho 685, 687, 747 P.2d 94, 96 (Ct. App. 1987). Post-conviction relief proceedings are designed to 
permit a challenge to an underlying conviction or to an illegal sentence; they are not intended as a 
means of pursuing a collateral attack upon the manner in which the t1ial court exercised its 
sentencing discretion. Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517,_, 960 P.2d 738, 741 (1998). 
Finally, on appeal, Johnson actually challenged his sentence and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed it. Therefore, he cannot raise it on post-conviction because when legal issues are decided in 
a criminal action on direct appeal, the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising 
them again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, _, 966 P.2d 1, 23 
(1998); State v. Fetterly, l 15 Idaho 231,233, 766 P.2d 701, 703 (1988). Post-conviction relief is not 
available merely to challenge a judge's exercise of discretion. Whitehawk v. State, 116 Idaho 831, 
833, 780 P.2d 153, 155 (Ct. App. 1989); Ramirez v. State, 113 Idaho 87, 89, 741 P.2d 374,376 (Ct. 
App. 1987). 
B. The Court dismisses the ineffective assistance of counsel claims asserted in the 
Amended Petition and, as set forth below, gives notice of its intent to dismiss any 
claim associated with witness Bangi. 
Like his failure to support his claims made in the original Petition, Johnson failed to support 
any of his new claims in the Amended Petition and in response to the Court's Conditional Dismissal 
failed to provide any additional support or facts. With the exception of the Bangi witness claim, the 
Court dismisses the remaining claims found in the Amended Petition. Johnson makes ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims against both his trial counsel and his appellate counsel. 
In an ineffective counsel claim, to establish a deficiency, an applicant must establish two 
things. The applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174, 1176 
(1988); Matthews v. State, 136 Idaho 46, 49, 28 P.3d 387, 390 (Ct. App. 2001). However, there is a 
strong presumption that trial counsel's performance falls within the wide range of "professional 
assistance" and will not be second-guessed on appeal unless those decisions are based on inadequate 
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-
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Aragon, 114 Idaho at 760, 760 P.2d at 1176. 
In addition, an applicant must show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he was 
,prejudiced by his attorney's deficiency; prejudice is shown by demonstrating the outcome would 
,have been different. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 691-92 (1984); Ramirez v. State, 119 
Idaho 1037, 1041, 812 P.2d 751, 755 (Ct. App. 1991). Further, "[t]o establish prejudice, the 
applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the 
outcome of the trial would have been different." Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 
787, 792 (2002) (quoting Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 282, 32 P.3d 672, 674 (Ct. App. 2001)). It 
is against this backdrop that the Court analyzes all of Johnson's ineffective counsel claims. 
Contrary to Johnson's claim, defense counsel is not required to raise every conceivable issue. 
Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Idaho appellate courts will not 
second guess strategic and tactical decisions of t1ial counsel whether to pursue a particular issue or 
theory, unless there is "evidence that the decision was the result of inadequate preparation, ignorance 
of the law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Short v. State, 135 Idaho 40, 13 
P.3d 1253, 1255-1256 (Ct. App. 2000) (citing Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 634, 639 
(Ct.A pp.I 993) ). 
1. Johnson presented no admissible evidence that his trial counsel failed to 
adequately investigate his necessity defense by obtaining what McKurcher may 
have told the prosecutor and the record disproves his claim. 
A petitioner for post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of the 
evidence, the allegations on which his claims are based. I.C.R. 57(c). Without any evidence, 
Johnson simply concludes that his counsel failed "to conduct an adequate investigation into whether 
a necessity defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of witnesses ... 9 
Tonya McKurcher." Johnson concedes McKurcher died before his trial and, therefore, was 
unavailable to testify. While Johnson simply claims without evidence that McKurcher spoke with 
the prosecutor's office, he does not support his claim with what evidence she may have given and the 
9 The Court addresses Rudy Bangi below. 
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record does not support his claim. Like other witnesses, in order to support an ineffective assistance 
of counsel, it is not enough to allege a failure to adequately investigate without proving what that 
investigation would have revealed because Johnson must demonstrate prejudice to succeed. Without 
that evidence, the Court finds Johnson cannot establish that her information would have changed the 
trial's outcome. 
Furthermore, the transcript indicates that Johnson's trial counsel actually investigated 
Johnson's claim that McKurcher spoke with the prosecutor and found that she had not been 
interviewed by the prosecutor. At the status conference held February 13, 2008, his trial counsel 
informed the Court as follows: 
HESSING: your honor, there is - just briefly, there was one - there was a person 
in the vehicle. There were actually two people in the vehicle. One of the persons has 
- she's since died. She's deceased. Before she passed away she informed Mr. 
Johnson that she had an Ada County - an investigator from the Ada County 
Prosecutor's Officer come out to speak with her at her home. And he told her that 
should let Mr. Johnson know that he should request that report because it would be 
helpful to him. This is information that he's given to me. I have spoken to Miss 
Longhurst and she indicated that she doesn't have any record of an investigator going 
out to talk to her. 
So I just did want to place on the record that Mr. Johnson has informed me of this and 
I have looked into it and I haven't been able to find anything. 
See Tr. p. 42-43. 
A defendant has the burden of identifying the acts or omissions of counsel that are alleged not 
to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at 695. As 
to a trial counsel's choice of witnesses, her manner of conducting cross-examination, and her lack of 
objection to the so-called damaging testimony, these points fall within "trial tactics" or "strategy 
choices" that are the exclusive domain of trial counsel. "This is an area where we will not second 
guess counsel without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." State v. Larkin, 102 Idaho 231, 234, 628 P.2d 1065, 
1068 (1981); see also State v. Elisondo, 97 Idaho 425,426, 546 P.2d 380,381 (1976). 
Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial counsel 
were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance." State v. Chapman, 120 Idaho 466, 469-470, 816 P.2d 1023, 1026 - 1027 (Ct. 
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App. 1991); See Strickland, supra 466 U.S. at 695. Therefore, the Court finds this allegation does 
not support post-conviction relief and dismisses it. 
2. Trial counsel's alleged failure to object to certain evidence does not support 
post-conviction relief. 
Johnson claims that his trial counsel failed to effectively assist him at trial by failing to object 
to evidence that was inadmissible or prejudicial, to wit: 
a. failing to adequately object to Officer Hancock's testimony with regard 
to accuracy and scientific validity of HGN testing results consistent with a .15 
blood alcohol content and the presence of benzodiazepine type drugs. 
b. failing to challenge the scientific basis and assertion by the state that 
horizontal gaze nystagmus can only be caused by "three drug categories plus 
one rare disease." 
c. failing to adequately object to and exclude evidence of the defendant's 
attempted guilty plea of November 14, 2007. 
d. failing to object to the impeachment of the defendant with secondary 
blood testing results although the defendant did not dispute the result of .15 on 
direct testimony. 
e. failing to object to cross examination regarding prior court 
proceedings, tactical and strategic conversations with counsel, and the 
timeliness of raising the necessity defense "before last Friday." 
f. failing to object to the jury instructions on the necessity defense. 
g. failing to request a cautionary instruction regarding the defendant's 
guilty plea. 
As discussed above, a trial counsel's manner of conducting cross-examination and lack of 
objection to the so-called damaging testimony fall within "trial tactics" or "strategy choices" that are 
the exclusive domain of trial counsel. It will not be second guessed "without evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." 
Larkin, 102 Idaho at 234,628 P.2d at 1068; Elisondo, 97 Idaho at 426, 546 P.2d at 381. 
Johnson has not shown anything in the record to suggest that these decisions of trial counsel 
were the result of unreasonable professional judgment, "outside the range of professionally 
competent assistance." Chapman, 120 Idaho at 469-470, 816 P.2d at 1026- 1027; Strickland, supra 
466 U.S. at 695. 
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3. Johnson presented no evidence that his appellate counsel was ineffective. 
Johnson simply complains without any further discussion that "Appellate counsel did not 
provide effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. Appellate counsel failed to raise any challenge to any of the evidentiary rulings 
identified in Count 2 of this Petition." A criminal defendant's right to effective representation by 
counsel extends to all critical stages of the proceedings, including appeal. Jakoski v. State, 136 Idaho 
280, 285, 32 P.3d 672, 677 (Ct. App. 2001); Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359, 883 P.2d 714, 717 
(Ct. App. 1994); Flores v. State, 104 Idaho 191, 194,657 P.2d 488,491 (Ct. App. 1983). Appellate 
counsel, however, is not required to raise every conceivable issue. See Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 
758, 765, 760 P.2d 1174, 1181 (1988). Rather, appellate counsel is required only to make a 
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho 115, 119, 937 P.2d 427,431 (Ct. App. 1997). 
The Supreme Court of the United States has held that if a state has created appellate courts as 
an integral part of the system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant, as is the 
case in Idaho, a first appeal guaranteed as a matter of right is not adjudicated in accord with due 
process of law where the appellant does not have effective assistance of counsel. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 
U.S. 387 (1985). In Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), the Supreme Court held that the 
pethioner was denied due process at the appellate level because his counsel failed to submit an 
appellate brief. The instant case is distinguishable. Unlike Anders, Johnson was not denied total 
access to the appellate process. His attorney made several arguments on his behalf. Johnson has not 
shown he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's failure to bring these additional arguments. As 
Justice Jackson has stated: 
The mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a lower 
court committed error. But receptiveness declines as the number of assigned errors 
increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any one. 
Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme Court, 25 Temple L.Q. 115, 119 (1951) 
(quoted in Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 (1983)). 
Moreover, the Supreme Court of the United States suggested in Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 
( 1982), that the failure to even make constitutional arguments does not render appellate counsel 
ineffective: "[T]he constitution guarantees criminal defendants only a fair trial and a competent 
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attorney. It does not insure that defense counsel will recognize and raise every conceivable 
constitutional claim." Id. at 133. In Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983), the Supreme Court held 
that appellate counsel does not have a constitutional duty to raise every non-frivolous issue requested 
by defendant. 
But as discussed above, the issues raised by Johnson are in fact frivolous and would not have 
changed the appellate court's decision. Therefore, appellate counsel's representation did not fall 
below an objective standard of reasonableness and the Court dismisses this claim. 
III. THE COURT CONDITIONALLY DISMISSES CLAIMS THAT TRIAL COUNSEL 
FAILED TO ADEQUATELY INVESTIGATE THE POTENTIAL ASSISTANCE 
WITNESS BANG I COULD PROVIDE AT TRIAL. 
Johnson's appointed counsel on post-conviction filed an Amended Petition that further 
alleges his trial counsel were ineffective as follows: 
1. Failure to investigate the factual and legal defenses, including, without 
limitation, the failure to conduct an adequate investigation into whether a necessity 
defense could be established based upon the statements or testimony of witnesses 
Rudy Bargi 10 [sic] .... 
2. Witness Rudy Bargi [sic] was not called at trial. Although trial counsel 
represented to the court that Mr. Bargi [sic] did not remember the events very well 
and was "incoherent" the Petitioner disputes this characterization and alleges that his 
trial attorney should have subpoenaed this material trial witness. The Petitioner was 
prejudiced by the failure of counsel to call a witness that could have testified as to the 
medical condition of McKurcher on the date of the arrest. 
L7 
During the status conference held on December l, 2010, Johnson's counsel asserted that there 
was no evidence in the record that Johnson's trial counsel had made any representations to the Court 
18 regarding her investigation of the propriety of calling Rudy Bangi at trial. Based on his 
19 
20 
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24 
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26 
representations, the Court set an evidentiary hearing. However, as discussed below, the Court finds 
no evidentiary hearing is necessary and vacates that hearing. 
After the December 1st hearing, the Court instructed the in-court clerk to review the minutes 
in the underlying case to determine when trial counsel infonned the Court witness Rudy Bangi was 
incoherent and had little to add. After the clerk reviewed those minutes he found that the discussion 
JO Bangi. 
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occurred just before the jury was brought into Court for voir dire. The discussion with counsel and 
the voir dire was not transcribed. Attached is a recording of that in-court exchange, and the Court 
hereby makes it part of the court record on post-conviction. Ex. A. 
As the recording demonstrates, the parties discussed the propriety of Johnson's necessity 
defense, and during that discussion, the Court indicated that before it would allow that defense to be 
presented to the jury, Johnson must make a proffer. During that discussion, Johnson's trial counsel 
informed the Court that she had contacted one of the passengers, Rudy Bangi, several times and that 
when she spoke with him he appeared incoherent. She told the Court that he told her he did not 
remember that night's events but that she would continue to try and contact him. 
HESSING: Your honor may I ask the Court when it would like that proffer? 
COURT: Well we're not going to do that right now we are about ready to bring 
in the jury. And that proffer will have to be through his testimony because my 
understanding is that no evidence was provided by way of discovery to the State. Is 
that correct? 
HESSING: Your honor that is correct. I can let the Court know however that I 
was in contact with a person that was listed in the State's police reports. I have yet to 
be able to speak to him because every time I've called him he has been incoherent and 
unable to talk to me. I'm not sure how old he is. I know he is fairly old. I have a 
phone number for him but I was unable to get an address to maybe have somebody go 
out and talk to him. and so at this point, I'm unsure that he is an appropriate witness. 
However, I was able to elicit some - he says he doesn't remember. And I was told by 
Mr. Johnson that he didn't remember that evening. Which is why I didn't try to 
contact him any sooner. I actually - when I did contact him he said he didn't really 
remember the evening. And I said well do you remember this and do you remember 
that and I was unable to understand his responses. But at one point he answered "yes" 
when I asked him if the other passenger in the vehicle had been driving at one point. I 
don't know how helpful that'll be if the rest of his answers are incoherent on the 
stand. I'm really at this point trying to find a time that I can - that he is coherent 
which I have been unable at this point. But I did want to let the Court know and the 
State know obviously if the State needs further time I understand that but I wouldn't 
be calling if I did until at least late Thursday that is my understanding or Friday which 
I believe would give the Court .... 
The State strongly objected to Bangi's testimony and ultimately the Court ruled that this witness 
could not be called for late disclosure, noting that it appeared that he had no evidence to offer in any 
event. While the Court did exclude this witness, this exchange clearly demonstrates that trial 
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counsel had investigated this witness and determined that he really could not add anything to the 
trial. 
The Court set February 20, 2008, to allow Johnson to present an offer of proof on his 
necessity defense. At that hearing, relevant to Bangi, after asking the Court to appoint new counsel, 
Johnson told the Court as follows: 
THE COURT: What witnesses are those? 
THE DEFENDANT: Mr. Rudy Bangi. He was a passenger in the vehicle. Whether 
he has any testimony at all, whatever he has, may be helpful. I have no idea what he 
he's going to testify to, what he has going, I have no idea, and she wouldn't either, 
Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, she's talked to him. She's indicated to this Court that she's 
spoken to him. and what she has indicated to this Court is he did not have a clear 
recollection of the events of that evening and that he was incoherent at times. So 
what testimony would what else should she have done? 
*** 
Q: Did you feel comfortable leaving Miss McKurcher with Mr. Bangi? 
A: I didn't feel comfortable leaving either one of them. 
Q: Whynot? 
A: Well, like I was stating, Mr. Bangi was kind of incoherent, he really didn't 
know what was going on, and Miss McKurcher was still in a state of not coming 
coherent to what was actually happening either. 
Tr. p. 203, Ins. 4-13 (emphasis added). 
Later in that hearing, while the State was arguing that the entire tapes should be played at trial 
because on Officer Short's tape, Officer Short asked "where are you coming from." And the tape 
showed Johnson and a female voice said "we're heading over to the WinCo." As the prosecutor 
pointed out: 
... The defendant and a female voice. I'm having a hard time with this huge medical 
emergency since she is coherent enough to talk and chitchat back and forth. And 
she's the one that said - and not in response to where are you going, where are you 
coming from, was the question that Officer Short asked. 
Tr. p. 224, Ins. 3-11. 
It is true that witness Rudy Bangi was not called at trial. However, trial counsel represented 
to the Court that she had spoken to Bangi several times, clearly investigating this potential witness 
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and that he did not remember the events very well. In fact, she represented to the Court that Bangi 
was "incoherent." Likewise, Johnson himself told the Court during his proffer that the night he 
claims this emergency justified a necessity defense, "Mr. Bangi was kind of incoherent, he really 
didn't know what was going on, .. " 
Johnson now "disputes" this by presenting an affidavit from Bangi made in February 2009, 
almost a year after the trial indicating that in fact he did remember the incident and he could have 
testified that Johnson had to drive the vehicle that night. However, Bangi is now dead and cannot 
testify. Moreover, while the Court accepts this affidavit as true for the purposes of Johnson's 
Amended Petition, this does not change the Court's analysis. 
First, the record clearly shows that trial counsel did investigate the potential effectiveness of 
this witness and had made certain strategic decisions. As discussed above, a trial counsel's choice of 
witnesses falls within the area of tactical, or strategic decisions, as does counsel's presentation of 
evidence. Rodgers v. State, 129 Idaho 720, 724, 932 P.2d 348, 352 (1996). It will not be second 
guessed "without evidence of inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other 
shortcomings capable of objective evaluation." Larkin, 102 Idaho at 234, 628 P.2d at 1068; 
Elisondo, 97 Idaho at 426, 546 P.2d at 381. The Court finds that there is no evidence of inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of the relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. 
Second, assuming Bangi was coherent one year after trial and now recalled what even 
Johnson himself suggested during trial he did not know, this does not mean trial counsel was 
ineffective because it is not evidence that Bangi was actually coherent and remembered the incident 
at the time of trial. The Court notes that he is unavailable for an evidentiary hearing. 
Finally, Johnson cannot meet the prejudice prong of Strickland because the tape recordings of 
the encounter between Johnson and law enforcement clearly belie his story. As the prosecutor noted 
a female, presumably McKurcher, 11 responded to the officer's questions and the officers released the 
car to her and apparently thought her capable of driving. It is unlikely that a jury would have been 
persuaded by any testimony from Bangi. 
11 There is no evidence any other female was present. 
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Therefore, the Court indicates its intention to dismiss any post-conviction claims related to 
witness Bangi. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court hereby dismisses the Amended Petition in part as noted above. It will entertain no 
additional argument or evidence regarding the dismissed claims. 
However, based on the above, the Court gives notice it intends to dismiss the one remaining 
claim in the Amended Petition related to witness Bangi. Johnson and the State may reply to the 
Court's notice of the proposed dismissal within 20 days. In light of his reply, if any, or any failure to 
reply, the Court may order the remaining claim in the Amended Petition dismissed, grant leave to file 
an amended application or, direct that the proceedings otherwise continue. NO AMENDMENTS 
MAY BE FILED WITHOUT LEA VE OF COURT. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DA TED this ih day of December 20 I 0. 
Cheri C. Copsey 
District Judge 
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